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Fielding congressional questioning during the financial crisis, former
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed his “distress” in
discovering a “flaw” in his free-market beliefs: “Those of us who have
looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder’s
equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.”1

The

financial crisis has also prompted the jurist and famous Chicago School
theorist Richard A. Posner to reconsider some of his earlier beliefs.2
Some say that the Chicago School’s economic theories with their strong
presumption of rational self-interested profit-maximizers with perfect
willpower lost their luster within academic circles over twenty years ago
with the rise of post-Chicago School game theories. The post-Chicago
School used rational actor models to challenge traditional Chicago

1

Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122476545437862295.html.
2
See, e.g., John Cassidy, Interview with Judge Posner, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 13,
2010 (interview with Posner) (“The more informal economics of Keynes has made a big
comeback because people realize that even though it is kind of loose . . . it seems to have
more of a grasp of what is going on in the economy.”), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-richardposner.html#ixzz0hJIhHeop; Marcus Baram, Judge Richard Posner Questions His FreeMarket Faith In “A Failure Of Capitalism,” HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 2009 (interview
with
Posner),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/20/judge-richard-posnerdisc_n_188950.html; RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08
AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).
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predictions. Nonetheless, antitrust’s economic theories, whether based on
the Chicago,3 post-Chicago,4 or Harvard Schools,5 continue to assume
rational self-interested market participants with perfect willpower.
This rationality assumption is under attack from several interdisciplinary economic fields, most notably behavioral economics.
Behavioral economics, the management consulting firm McKinsey and
Company recently observed, “is now mainstream.”6

Even before the

financial crisis, behavioral economics was a hot topic. It is a staple in
graduate economics programs, business schools, and increasingly in law
schools.7 Recent best-sellers have featured behavioral economics, such as
THE MYTH

OF THE

RATIONAL MARKET,8 ANIMAL SPIRITS,9 PREDICTABLY

IRRATIONAL,10 and NUDGE.11

Behavioral economics has also led to

subspecialties in the areas of
•
3

subjective well-being and happiness;12

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
4
See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 113, at 134 (2d ed. 2000)
(“Business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers”); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review & Critique, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 259 (2001);
Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445-695 (1995).
5
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
101 (2007) (summarizing contributions of Harvard School to modern antitrust analysis).
6
Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case for Behavioral Strategy, McKinsey
Quarterly 2 (March 2010).
7
Law schools, such as University of Tennessee, Yale, Harvard, and Georgetown offer
behavioral law and economics seminars.
8
JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD,
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009).
9
GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
(2009).
10
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (2008).
11
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
12
RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 29–30 (2005);
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•

marketing (including the paradox of choice);14

•

behavioral finance;15

•

criminal justice;16
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Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want? Competition Policy & the Role of
Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 928-40 (2010); George
Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation & the Role of Decision & Experience
Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUBLIC ECON. 1795-1810 (2008); Daniel Kahneman & Alan
B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3-24 (2006); Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data
in Economics, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (2006); Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be
Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion, SCIENCE, June 30, 2006, at 1908-1910;
Richard Layard, Happiness & Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession, 116 ECON. J.
C24–C33 (2006); Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard
of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161-181 (2005); Bruno S. Frey &
Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 402-435 (2002).
13
See, e.g., Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Competition & Truth in the
Market for News, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 133–154 (2008); Matthew A. Baum & Tim Groeling,
New Media & the Polarization of American Political Discourse, 25 POL. COMM. 345–365
(2008); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from
U.S. Daily Newspapers, NBER Working Paper 12707 (2007), available at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/matthew.gentzkow/biasmeas052507.pdf; Stefano DellaVigna
& Ethan Kaplan, The Political Impact of Media Bias, in FACT FINDER, FACT FILTER: HOW
MEDIA
REPORTING
AFFECTS
PUBLIC
POLICY
(2007),
available
at
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/wp/mediabiaswb07-06-25.pdf; Charles S. Taber &
Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 755–769 (2006); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media, Education & AntiAmericanism in the Muslim World, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 117-133 (2004).
14
BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004); Simona
Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social Welfare,
25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 24 (2006). As for the implications of the paradox of
choice on the poor, see Marianne Bertrand et al., Behavioral Economics & Marketing in
Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 8, 12 (2006).
15
2 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005); ROBERT J.
SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2001).
16
Richard H. McAdams and Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and
Economics (November 11, 2008), U. CHI. L. & ECON., Olin Working Paper No. 440, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1299963; Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice With
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision
Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188-200 (2006).
17
See, e.g., Devin G. Pope and Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse?
Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes (June 13, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419027.
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•

health care;18

•

behavioral political economy;19

•

behavioral institutional design;20

•

behavioral labor economics;21 and

•

behavioral industrial organization.22

The financial crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak
regulation, our lack of understanding about how many markets actually
operate, and moral hazard. The crisis has also prompted U.S. policymakers
to reexamine the assumptions underlying the prevailing neoclassical
economic

theories.23

Competition

authorities

in

the

European

Commission,24 U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading,25 and United States26 are

18

See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral
Economics Perspective, 53 SAINT LOUIS U. L. J. 1189 (2009).
19
Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J.
ECON. LIT. 315, 364 (2009).
20
Id. at 364-65.
21
Id. at 362-63.
22
Id. at 361-62.
23
John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Markets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 9.
24
Eliana Garcés, The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer and Competition
Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 145 (2010); “Why Consumers behave the way they
do: Commissioner Kuneva hosts high level conference on Behavioural Economics,”
Reference
No.
IP/08/1836
(Nov.
28,
2008),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1836&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
25
See, e,g., Office of Fair Trading, The Impact of Price Frames on Consumer Decision
Making (May 2010), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/OFT1226.pdf;
Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy?,
6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 111, 118 (Spring 2010); Amelia Fletcher, “What do consumer
policymakers
need
from
behavioural
economists?”
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/conference/video_fletcher_en.htm.
26
FTC Commissioner Rosch, for example, has been interested in the implications of
behavioral economics for competition policy. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n,, Behavioral Economics: Observations Regarding Issues that Lie Ahead (June 9,
2010), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf; J. Thomas Rosch,
Comm’r, Federal Trade Comm’n, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations on
Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Jan.
6, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100106financial-products.pdf. Likewise, Carl
Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and Joe
Farrell, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, recently acknowledged that

6
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interested in behavioral economics. The American Antitrust Institute27 and
antitrust scholars28 are turning to behavioral economics. Soon enterprising
antitrust lawyers may raise behavioral economics findings in white papers
to the agencies or in federal court pleadings.

In fact, the behavioral

economics literature was recently raised before the U.S. Supreme Court,29
in a case where two Chicago School theorists (Judges Posner and
Easterbrook) disagreed on the mutual fund industry’s efficiency.30
The immediate question is to what extent the irrational conduct that
behavioral economics identifies should have implications for evaluating
whether conduct is anticompetitive. The Chicago School’s neoclassical
economic theories teach that irrationality is irrelevant to antitrust doctrine:
behavioral economics may offer insights relevant to antitrust and consumer protection
analysis. Roundtable Interview with Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, ANTITRUST SOURCE
(February 2010).
27
At its 2008 annual meeting, the American Antitrust Institute’s (AAI) keynote
speaker and panelists discussed the applicability of behavioral economics to competition
policy. AAI, Audio Recordings from AAI’s Annual National Conference,
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/2008conferenceaudio.ashx (last visited Jan. 10,
2010); see also AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE
AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE
44TH PRESIDENT 26, 172, 185, 200–01, 272–75 (2008) (recommending more empirical
analysis to further antitrust policies involving cartels, mergers, and media industries);
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, available at
http://www.biicl.org/clf/clfmeetings2009/ (hosting a Competition Law Forum on
behavioral economics in July 2009).
28
At the Next Generation of Antitrust Scholarship Conference held at NYU law school
in January 2010, several papers applied behavioral economics to antitrust policy. See Max
Huffman, Behavioral Exploitation and Antitrust; Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner,
Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin, University of
Haifa Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series (Dec. 1, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522948; Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral
Economics Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT (Caron
Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds. Hart Publishing Oxford forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535720.
29
Brief of Robert Litan, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Harris
Assoc., No. 08-586 (U.S. June 17, 2009).
30
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc den. 527 F.3d
627. The Court ultimately eschewed the issue, 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1431 (2010), holding that
the debate between Judges Easterbrook and Posner was “a matter for Congress, not the
courts.”
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rational firms eliminate irrationality from the marketplace.

After the

financial crisis, however, one cannot assume that markets operate as
efficiently as the Chicago School predicts. Antitrust policymakers must
inquire what role behavioral economics can play in the agencies’
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws.31
With increasing interest in behavioral economics’ implications for
competition policy, Part I of this Article provides an overview of behavioral
economics. Part II discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested
profit-maximizers became so embedded in antitrust policy.

Part III

discusses to what extent the behavioral economics literature can inform
antitrust policies and cause lawmakers to question their neoclassicallybased assumptions. Part IV offers several recommendations related to the
practical application of behavioral economics to antitrust law going
forward.
I. OVERVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
A. What Is Behavioral Economics?
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that humans are rational, selfinterested beings with perfect willpower. In making determinations under
their Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, for example, assume that actual
behavior comports with rational, self-interested (i.e., profit-maximizing)
behavior.32 In conduct cases, the U.S. federal courts dismiss complaints or
grant summary judgment if antitrust plaintiffs’ theories do not make
“economic sense,” such as alleging economically irrational behavior.33
31

For purposes of this article, the relevant laws are Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. '' 1-2, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. ' 18.
32
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §
1.0 (2010), [hereinafter “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”] (“In evaluating how a merger will
likely change a firm’s behavior, the Agencies focus primarily on how the merger affects
conduct that would be most profitable for the firm.”).
33
Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261
(2010); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (requiring a plaintiff plead
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Behavioral economics uses methods from neuroscience and social
sciences such as psychology and sociology to understand the limits of this
assumption.34 Testing this rationality assumption through experiments,35
behavioral economists find that people systematically and predictably do
not behave in certain scenarios as neoclassical economic theory predicts.36
Instead, behavioral economics characterizes human behavior as defined by
three traits: bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded selfinterest.
1. Bounded Rationality
Rational agents in theory seek out the optimal amount of information
and readily and continually update their prior factual beliefs with relevant
and reliable empirical data. It is similar to a treasure hunt: as we receive
new factual clues along the way, we revise our beliefs and modify our
behavior.

In contrast, bounded rationality acknowledges the distinction

between reasoning versus intuition.37 Consumers are not perfectly objective
and rational Bayesians (in that they readily update prior factual beliefs
whenever appraised of reliable information).

Instead, while we may

maintain an illusion of objectivity, our goals (much like those of a
prosecutor seeking to convince the court of the defendant’s guilt) can bias
our beliefs about everything from our perception of ourselves, other people,
and events, to the value of goods or services, to our evaluation of scientific
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
34
For interesting surveys of the behavioral economics research, see MORAL
SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN
ECONOMIC LIFE (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
(Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004); DellaVigna, supra note 19; Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998).
35
DellaVigna, supra note 19; Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral
Economics: Past, Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note
34, at 7.
36
Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L.
REV. 237, 242-43 (2008).
37
Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003).

9-Aug-10]
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evidence.38 As a result, we access only a subset of our relevant knowledge
and give undue weight to evidence that supports our beliefs while
discounting evidence that undercuts our beliefs.
In one experiment, the subjects received the same twenty-seven pages of
evidentiary materials from an actual Texas lawsuit filed by an injured
motorcyclist against the driver of the automobile that collided with him.39
Subjects were randomly assigned the role of plaintiff or defendant. After
reading the case materials, they predicted what the judge had awarded and
what a “fair” settlement would be.

Participants playing the plaintiff

predicted a significantly larger award by the judge (on average $14,527
higher than defendants’ prediction). The plaintiffs and defendants each
recalled more arguments favoring their side, and weighed the arguments
favoring their side more heavily. In a later experiment, the subjects first
read the case materials and offered their estimates of the judge's award and
a fair settlement. Only then were they told of their role as plaintiff or
defendant. Those who learned their roles after they offered estimates had
closer estimates of the likely award, and were significantly more likely to
settle.
Another key insight of bounded rationality is that humans rely on rules
of thumb (heuristics) in making decisions, and engage in a couple of steps
of iterated reasoning. For example, framing effects (the way the choice is
framed, such as a sure gain or avoiding a loss) can alter the way we
decide.40 In one experiment individuals were offered either a fifty percent
38

Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 482-95
(1990).
39
Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 328.
40
Under the Asian Disease hypothetical, 600 people are expected to die. The majority
choose Program A (saving a sum certain of lives (200 people)) versus Program B (onethird probability that 600 people will be saved (two-thirds probability that no one will be
saved)). Yet a substantial majority did not choose Program A when it presented a sum
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chance of $110 or $50.

Rational profit-maximizers should opt for the

greater discounted value – the 50 percent chance ($55); yet most people
were risk adverse and opted for $50. But when they stood to lose either $50
versus a fifty percent chance of losing $110, many became risk seeking and
opted for the latter. Moreover, losses closer to a reference point hurt more
than the joy from comparable gains.41 Bounded rationality encompasses
other anomalies in human decision-making, including:
•

the endowment effect (when we demand much more to give up and
sell an object than what we would be willing to pay to acquire that
object);42

•

status quo bias (when the choice of default option impacts the
outcome);43

•

anchoring effects (how a randomly chosen standard may
subsequently influence a judgment on the same task);44

•

availability heuristic (when we assess the probability of an event by
asking whether relevant examples come readily to mind);45

certain of deaths (400) versus Program B (one-third probability that 600 people will be
saved (no deaths) and two-thirds probability that 600 people will die). Kahneman, supra
note 37, at 1458.
41
Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1456.
42
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 63 (1992); Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1482, 1484, 1498; Daniel
Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98
J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1327 tbl.1 (1990) (summarizing studies).
43
THALER, supra note 42, at 68-70.
44
One series of experiments is to establish an arbitrary initial price (such as the last
two digits of one’s social security number) in the test subjects’ minds. While that initial
price is arbitrary, once it is established in their minds, it shapes what the subjects are
willing to pay for that item and related items. Ariely, supra note 1010, at 25-28; Englich et
al., supra note 16 (describing how sentencing anchor can influence judges and
prosecutors).
45
Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1467 (people estimating more words on page that end
with “–ing” than have the second from last letter ending with “n” or estimating twice the
number of murders in Detroit versus the state of Michigan).

9-Aug-10]
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representative heuristic (when we ignore the “base rates and
overestimate the correlation between what something appears to be
and what something actually is”);46

•

overconfidence bias (where, for example, executives in several
behavioral studies were overconfident in their ability to manage a
company, systematically underestimated their competitors’ strength,
and were prone to self-serving interpretations of reality (such as
taking credit for positive outcomes, and blaming the environment
for negative outcomes));47

•

optimistic bias (when we believe that good things are more likely
(and bad things less likely) than average to happen to us);48 and

•

hindsight bias (our tendency to overestimate the ex ante prediction
that we had concerning the likelihood of an event’s occurrence after
learning that it actually did occur).49

46

Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1462; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1086 (2000) (citing Tversky and Kahneman’s bank teller problem).
47
C. Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors: A Survey of the Empirical Literature
(May 2008) Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Preprint No. 2008/23
7-8, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135184; DellaVigna, supra note 19.
48
Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to
Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 313 (Thomas Gilovich eds. 2002).
49
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 46, at 1095-1100.
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2. Bounded Willpower
Willpower refers to the notion of self-control: when we know something
is bad for us, we avoid it. Bounded willpower, in contrast, refers to when
we knowingly engage in actions known to be detrimental and therefore act
contrary to our long-term interests.50 As anyone who has ever overeaten,
overspent, or otherwise succumbed to temptation (despite having the best
intentions not to do so) can confirm, many people are not very good at
predicting their willpower.
Recent neurological research has examined to what extent the
discrepancy between short-run and long-run human preferences reflects the
activation of different parts of the brain’s neural system.51 This research
suggests

that

choices

that

involve

an

immediate

reward

can

disproportionately activate the impulsive part of the brain (the Limbic
system) rather than the more deliberative part of the brain that engages in
long-term cost-benefit analyses (the Lateral Prefontal Cortex).52

At a

practical level, these insights suggest that, in situations that involve a shortterm gain even at a long-term cost, we may not engage in the cost-benefit
analysis expected under rational choice theory.
Thus, recognizing our bounded willpower, we at times seek
commitment devices. We opt for automatic payroll deductions into 401(k)
retirement plans, certificates of deposit, or other plans with liquidity
restrictions to constrain our immediate consumption.53 We may place the
50

Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1480.
Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate & Delayed
Monetary Rewards, SCIENCE, Oct. 13, 2004, at 503-507.
52
Id. (showing that choices involving an immediate outcome disproportionately
activated the Limbic system and that, in contrast, when participants chose a long-run
option, the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex was significantly more active than the Limbic
system).
53
For the effectiveness of changing the default option to automatic enrollment in
retirement accounts, see Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™:
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164-87
(2004); John Beshears, et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings,
51
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alarm clock further away, not shop when we are hungry, or set our watch
slightly ahead of time.

These commitment devices – while a rational

response to our bounded willpower – can lead us to “overcorrect” for our
bounded willpower.54 We may pay more for less of what we like too much
(such as buying cigarettes individually or by the pack rather than by the
carton). And, more generally, we may behave in ways contrary to the tenets
of wealth maximization (such as giving the U.S. government an interestfree loan by withholding too much taxes from our paycheck to ensure a
return at tax time).
3. Bounded Self-Interest
Self-interest means people seek to maximize their wealth and other
material goals, and generally do not care about other social goals, to the
extent they conflict with personal wealth maximization. Bounded selfinterest, the behavioral experiments confirm, means that human motivation
is more nuanced and complex than this simplistic assumption of selfinterest.55
Psychological and experimental economic evidence show that people
care about treating others, and being treated, fairly.56 Recent experiments in
bargaining settings, for example, systematically show “that substantial
fractions of most populations adhere to moral rules, willingly give to others,
and punish those who offend standards of appropriate behavior, even at a
cost to themselves and with no expectation of material reward.”57 This
NBER Working Paper 12009 (Jan. 2006); Bridgette C. Madrian & Dennis Shea, The Power
of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(K) Participation & Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 11491187 (2001).
54
Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, 89 AMERICAN ECON.
REV. 103, 111-12 (1999) (discussing how sophisticated individuals recognize their
bounded willpower and preproperate (i.e., doing a chore earlier than they need to)).
55
Stucke, Money, supra note 12.
56
Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1479.
57
Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-interested Citizens May Undermine “The
Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, SCIENCE, June 20, 2008, at
1606.
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“strong reciprocity” in human behavior, however, also entails “a
predisposition . . . to punish [at personal cost] those who violate the norms
of cooperation, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be
repaid . . . .”58 Similarly, behavioral experiments suggest that many people
do not free ride at all (or to the extent that rational choice theory predicts).
In these public goods experiments, “people have a tendency to cooperate
until experience shows that those with whom they’re interacting are taking
advantage of them.”59 Consequently individuals at times act benevolently
even when it is not in their financial interest (such as tipping waiters and
waitresses in cities they are unlikely to revisit) and will sacrifice monetary
gains to punish those they feel are acting unfairly, such as by deviating from
an established reference point of “fairness.”
One frequently cited experiment of negatively reciprocal behavior and
bounded self-interest is the “Ultimatum Game,” where a subject is given
some money and must offer a second subject some portion thereof. If the
second subject accepts the offer, both can keep the money. If the second
subject rejects the offer, neither keeps the money. Neoclassical economic
theory predicts people will offer the smallest amount—one penny.

If

everyone pursues their self-interest, the first subject would selfishly want as
much money as possible; the second subject recognizes that a penny is
better than nothing.
But actual experiments of this Ultimatum Game in over twenty
countries show the contrary. In expanding the Ultimatum Game experiment

58

Herbert Gintis et al., Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24 EVOLUTION &
HUM. BEHAV. 153, 154 (2003) (arguing that “the evolutionary success of our species and
the moral sentiments that have led people to value freedom, equality, and representative
government are predicated upon strong reciprocity and related motivations that go beyond
inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism”).
59
THALER, supra note 42, at 14.
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to fifteen small-scale economies from twelve countries on four continents,60
participants reciprocated and did not offer the nominal amount. Nor did
high financial stakes eliminate this bounded self-interest.61 Most offered
significantly more than the nominal amount (ordinarily forty to fifty percent
of the total amount available) and recipients about half the time rejected
nominal amounts (less than twenty percent of the total amount available).
Consequently, most receivers in this game forgo wealth to punish unfair
offers, and offerors generally offer more than the nominal profitmaximizing amount.62 Wealth may be still relevant to offerors, but unlike
the self-interested profit-maximizer, they recognize the need for a sense of
fairness and equity to maximize their return.
Similarly, one recent study found that informal religious norms can play
an important role in supporting a competitive market economy.63 The study
measured the individuals’ propensities for fairness and willingness to
punish unfairness. The study involved fifteen populations that vary in their
degree of market integration and their participation in a world religion (such
as Islam or Christianity). The financial stakes in the behavioral experiments
were set at one day’s local wages. The results reflected a stark contrast
between nomadic, non-integrated, fully-subsistence societies with local
religions (such as the Hadza population from Tanzania) and fully marketincorporated societies with world-wide religions (such as the residents of
Missouri, United States and Accra City, Ghana). As market integration
increases (as measured by the percentage of purchased calories in diet), so
too people become generous (sharing more of the day’s wages with the

60

Gintis et al., supra note 58, at 154.
Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1468–69.
62
Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the TwentyFirst Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 513, 529-30 (2007).
63
Joseph Henrich et al., Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of
Fairness and Punishment, SCIENCE, March 19, 2010, at 1480.
61
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other player in the Dictator Game). Likewise, as the society’s participation
in Islam or Christianity increases, so too does the sharing in these
behavioral experiments increase by about 6 to 10 percent.
Aside from reciprocity, individuals at times may act from an intrinsic
motivation, independent of any financial reward. Indeed, financial rewards
at times decrease (rather than increase) motivation or the likelihood of the
desired results.64 Likewise, financial disincentives may not be as effective
as social or ethical norms in curbing unwanted behavior.65
B. Some Criticisms and Shortcomings of Behavioral Economics, and
Responses to Those Criticisms
While amused by the behavioral economics literature, some question
its applicability to individual (or firm) behavior in the marketplace.
1. Representativeness
One criticism is that behavioral economics focuses on certain persons
not representative of the total population (namely university students) in an
artificial setting (namely lab experiments).66

So naturally students’

decisions in experimental games with small financial stakes could differ
from real market behavior with often greater financial stakes.67

64

For example, in one study, high school students collected donations for a public
purpose in Israel’s annually publicized “donation days.” One group of students received a
pep talk about the importance of these donations. A second group, in addition to the pep
talk, was promised one percent of the amount collected (to be paid from an independent
source). A third group was promised ten percent of the amount collected. Under rational
choice theory, the third group, motivated by the greater financial incentive, should collect
the most donations. Instead, the groups promised the one percent and ten percent shares
collected a lower average amount ($153.67 and $219.33, respectively) than the group given
only the pep talk ($238.60). Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Incentives, Punishment, and
Behavior, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 573-80.
65
Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 64, at 581–86.
66
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1556 (1998).
67
At times, the behavior of university students is closer to rational choice theory. For
example, university students are more likely than non-students to give nothing in dictator
games. Christoph Engel, Dictator Games: A Meta Study, MPI Collective Goods Preprint
No. 2010/07, at 13 (March 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568732.
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First behavioral lab experiments enable researchers to isolate variables
and examine how behavior correlates with each variable (although one
criticism from non-economists is that these experiments are an elaborate
and costly way of telling us what we already know). Moreover, today’s
behavioral economics literature includes field experiments and data from
actual market transactions.68 Not surprisingly, marketing companies are
devoting resources on behavioral experiments and neuroscience to learn
more about consumers’ behavior decisions.69
2. Firm v. Individual Behavior
A second criticism is that the insights from behavioral economics about
individual behavior are not helpful in predicting firm behavior in
competitive markets. Market participants typically are repeat players who
learn from and correct their mistakes. Firms and their employees have
greater incentives to rationally profit-maximize, as they often are subject to
competitive pressures.70 Many firms benefit from the division of labor, and
accordingly train or hire experts to capture the benefits from specialized
knowledge. Irrational participants eventually exit the market. Thus, as
Posner opines, “unusually ‘fair’ ” people will avoid or be forced out of
“roughhouse activities—including highly competitive businesses, trial
lawyering, and the academic rat race.”71

For several reasons, these

criticisms are misplaced.
First, neoclassical economists often use the stock market as the
example that most closely approximates perfect competition.72 But how
68

For one recent survey of the literature, see DellaVigna, supra note 19, at 320–65.
Stuart Elliott, A Quest to Learn What Drives Consumer Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, June
30,
2010,
at
B3,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/business/media/30adco.html.
70
See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism & Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133,
140–41, 144–46 (2006) (arguing that consumers outside the lab have stronger incentives to
reduce error, which they can through experience).
71
Posner, supra note 66, at 1570.
72
Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 3, at 164.
69
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many people after the financial crisis still have faith in the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, which posits that stock prices reflect their fundamental value
(the discounted sum of expected future cash flow)? The behavioral finance
literature questions the degree of efficiency in the stock market and
addresses the limits of arbitrage.73 Consequently, if irrationality is not
driven out of supposedly perfectly competitive markets, why should we
assume that irrationality is driven out in less efficient markets?
Accordingly, the assumption that bounded rational consumers magically
transform themselves individually or collectively into rational, far-sighted,
strategic maximizers with perfect willpower upon entering the workplace is
empirically suspect.
Indeed there is evidence that firms as institutions may depart from
rationality, although at times in different ways and degrees than individuals
do. People can behave differently depending on situational factors, such as
when alone or in groups.74

Groups, at times, can minimize individual

biases, but at other times (such as cults, mobs, and “groupthink”75) displace
independent thinking.

Firm behavior itself can vary, as firms vary by

purpose (non-profit versus profit), structure (partnership, family concern,
conglomerate),

national

identity and

cultural

norms

(local

firm,

multinational), regulatory environment (utility versus unregulated concern),
and size (large versus small).
Take, for example, the United States’ antitrust challenge of MIT and
73

ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE (2000); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); see
also Diana B. Henriques, Odd Crop Prices Defy Economics, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2008
(noting how on dozens of occasions since early 2006 the futures contracts for corn, wheat
and soybeans have expired at a price much higher than the day’s cash price for those
grains).
74
PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT (2008).
75
Robert S. Baron, So Right It's Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of
Polarized Group Decision Making, in Vol. 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 219 (Mark. P. Zanna, ed. 2005).
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eight Ivy League universities.76

19

For years the universities collectively

determined the amount of financial aid for prospective students admitted to
two or more of their universities. MIT on appeal raised an interesting
argument. In a perfectly competitive market, price equals marginal cost,
and no rational profit-maximizing firm (outside of a predatory pricing
scheme) would price below marginal cost.

MIT priced its discounted

tuition to needy students at substantially below its marginal cost of
providing education for one year. Because profit-maximizing companies
would not engage in such “economically abnormal” behavior, MIT argued,
its activity must be noncommercial.77 The Third Circuit rejected MIT’s
argument.78 But it implicitly accepted that firms do not always behave as
rational profit-maximizers.
One explanation as to why firms behave irrationally is that firms cannot
always monitor and deter bounded rational employees from acting contrary
to the firms’ long-term interests. As discussed infra, “CEOs may be overly
optimistic about the profitability of mergers or other actions they
undertake” and “managers might face incentives which induce them to care
about relative rather than absolute profits.”79 Similarly, when executives
conspire to fix prices, they are not always acting with their firms’
knowledge or at their behest.
Second, bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest can affect
competition through the individual behavior of the millions of atomistic
self-employed workers who supply their services or products into the
76

United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 666.
78
The court noted that MIT’s full tuition figure was also significantly below its
marginal cost. So “whether the price charged for educational services is below marginal
cost is not probative of the commercial or noncommercial nature of the methodology
utilized to determine financial aid packages.” Id.
79
Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A
Primer, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2 (Spring 2010); Engel, Behaviour of Corporate
Actors, supra note 47.
77
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supply chain.80 This group includes self-employed farmers, ranchers,
fishermen, free-lance writers, doctors, lawyers, and architects. These
individuals can behave contrary to rational choice theory.81
Third, bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest can affect
competition through the individual behavior of the hundreds of millions of
consumers. Individuals in the U.S. spend annually trillions of dollars on
goods and services ($3.201 trillion in purchases on credit, debit, and prepaid
cards in 2009),82 so their bounded rational behavior can affect competition
in many markets.

Even if firms were relatively more rational than

consumers, behavioral economics is relevant in understanding consumer
decision-making and how firms compete to help or exploit these bounded
rational consumers.
One staple of antitrust policy is predicting how consumers would
respond to firms’ raising the price of their goods or services by a small but
significant non-transitory amount.

Price frames, under rational choice

theory, should not affect the consumers’ decision. But the U.K.’s Office of
Fair Trading (“OFT”) recently studied how firms can use price frames to
exploit bounded rational consumers.83 The OFT’s behavioral experiment
80

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data Household Data Annual Averages
Annual Averages -- Table 12: Employed persons by sex, occupation, class of worker, fullor part-time status, and race (reporting 8.995 million self-employed non-agricultural
workers and 836,000 self-employed agricultural workers in the U.S. in 2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat12.pdf.
81
Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 133 (2010); Colin F. Camerer, Prospect
Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS,
supra note 34, at 148, 149; Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Bias, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra
note 34, at 326, 333 (public school teachers); Colin F. Camerer et al., Labor Supply of New
York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS,
supra note 34, at 533 (questioning intertemporal substitution hypothesis that taxi drivers
will work longer hours on high wage days).
82
The
Nilson
Report
(May
2010),
available
at
http://www.nilsonreport.com/pdf/1freeissue.pdf.
83
OFT, Price Frames, supra note 25.
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found that consumers deviated from rational choice theory in the following
five price frames: (i) “drip pricing,” where a lower price is initially
disclosed to the consumer and additional charges are added as the sale
progresses; (ii) “sales,” where the “sales” price is referenced off an inflated
regular price (was $2, now $1); (iii) “complex pricing,” such as three-fortwo offers, where the unit price requires some computation; (iv) “baiting,”
where sellers promote a special deal, but offer only a limited number of
goods at that price; and (v) “time limited offers”, where the special price is
available for a short period. Consumers made more mistakes and were
especially worse off under drip pricing and time-limited offers. Thus one
application of behavioral economics to antitrust is to model consumer
behavior and consider the effect of this behavior on competition.
As these observations suggest, the empirical question is not whether
firms and consumers are equally irrational, but the degree and type of biases
and heuristics that different firms display. Not surprisingly, there is already
a wide body of research on this topic in the business literature.

That

literature discusses the substantial variation in the ways corporations learn
(such as the routines and forms of organizational structure they use).84 The
empirical and theoretical work on organizational learning rests on bounded
rationality and offers several insights about how firms engage in different
forms of intra-firm conduct to overcome their bounded rationality and to
compete more effectively with other firms.85
84

Among the literature’s

Lovallo & Sibony, supra note 6, at 3 (noting recent survey of 2,207 executives
where only 28 percent said the quality of their companies’ strategic decisions was generally
good, 60 percent thought that bad decisions were about as frequent as good ones, and 12
percent thought good decisions were altogether infrequent).
85
See Linda Argote & Henrich R. Greve, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm – 40 Years
and Counting: Introduction and Impact, 18 ORG. SCI. 337 (2007) (surveying impact of
Behavioral Theory of the Firm’s impact on organizational science research, including
institutional theory and population ecology); Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo, On the
Evolutionary and Behavioral Theories of Organizations: A Tentative Roadmap, 18 ORG.
SCI. 491 (2007).
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insights:
•

firms that better implement and update their learning (such as
through routines) can better collect and exploit their knowledge,
yield greater productive efficiencies, and enjoy a competitive
advantage;86

•

firms may improve feedback mechanisms, whereby employees
can learn from their mistakes and improve their reasoning and
willpower;87

•

firms can promote different social, ethical and moral values that
affect firm behavior88 and therefore reduce their monitoring
costs and increase their competitiveness by inculcating a unique
identity.89

Neoclassical economic theory, with its assumption of rational agents,
offers few insights on such intra-firm behavior. Logically, if firms behaved
as rational profit-maximizers, one would not expect this form of
competition. Rational firms could not enjoy a competitive advantage in
how they search and incorporate knowledge, since they all automatically
search for and act upon the optimal amount of information.
86

One would

See Argote & Greve, supra note 85, at 343.
John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the
Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615 (2004); John A. List, Does Market Experience
Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q. J. ECON. 41 (2003). For example, frequent and more
experienced sports cards traders display less of an endowment effect for sports cards (such
as baseball trading cards) than for other items such as chocolates and mugs.
88
Paul C. Nystrom, Differences in Moral Values between Corporations, 9 J. BUS.
ETHICS 971, 974 (1990) (survey of how closely-matched corporations within industrial
sectors differed significantly in the perceived importance of the management’s moral
values).
89
GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELLBEING 39-59 (2010) (exploring how
workers can abide to shared corporate norms, and lose utility when they put in low effort,
and how job-holders, if they have only monetary rewards and only economic goals, “will
game the system insofar as they can get away with it”).
87
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therefore not expect business executives to expend resources on improving
their decision processes if they indeed behaved as rational profitmaximizers.

Moreover, one would expect rational choice theory to

dominate the MBA curricula. Instead the strategic management texts, one
survey found, provide “precious little support” for the Chicago School’s
theory of the firm.90
3. No Unifying Theory
A third criticism is that behavioral economics, while identifying the
predictive shortcomings of neoclassical economic theory, does not provide
an alternative unifying theory to explain human or firm behavior.91 But this
criticism misconstrues the purpose of behavioral economics. Neoclassical
economic theory has supplied an organizing principle, as well as an
important level of nuance by importing new microeconomic thinking into
competition law.

The purpose of behavioral economics is to augment

neoclassical economic theory by providing more realistic assumptions of
human behavior.
irrationally,”92

By teaching that humans may behave “predictably

behavioral

economics

provides

a

mechanism

for

policymakers to consider whether and to what extent they should refine
existing frameworks to account for nuances in human behavior.
Behavioral economics does not necessarily call for less or more
antitrust regulation. If anything, it draws into question our reliance on
economic theory when the evidence suggest otherwise.

It calls into

question our preoccupation with the cost of false positives (which has taken
90

Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 67, 74 (2003).
91
Posner, supra note 66, at 1559–60; cf. Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as
Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1577, 1586 (1998) (noting how behavioral economics “can better be seen as a series of
particular counterstories, formed largely in parasitic reaction to the unduly self-confident
predictions of rational choice theorists, than as an alternative general theory of human
behavior”).
92
ARIELY, supra note 10.
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prominence over the thirty years) while not attending to the cost of false
negatives. And, as discussed infra, it raises questions about our ability to
predict outcomes and optimize efficiency through antitrust’s rule-of-reason
standard, suggesting that antitrust’s prevailing legal standard be brought
closer to rule-of-law principles.
4. Rule-of-Law Concerns
Another criticism is that even if neoclassical economic analysis does
not indicate the correct result in every case, it has promoted greater
predictability and consistency in antitrust analysis.93 Thus the fear is that
behavioral economics will increase the range of outcomes reached in an
antitrust case, and thus inject more unpredictability into competition law.
We are sensitive to this concern. Antitrust law must comport as much
as feasible with rule-of-law principles. Possible civil or criminal liability
should not depend on the latest economic theory. Neoclassical economic
theory has provided a basis for evaluating antitrust cases, and in some cases,
simply-stated legal norms. Moreover, while economic theory has many
dialects, it can provide a common language for competition authorities
across the globe.
But neoclassical economic theory has its imperfections.

First, as

discussed infra, neoclassical theory, because of its dependence on a flawed
assumption of rationality, provides an incomplete, and at times incorrect,
account of competition. Antitrust legal standards that rely on neoclassical
theory can lead to high error costs, thereby undercutting the goals of
competition law.

Through a more persuasive and complex theory of

rationality, behavioral economics can provide a superior account of
competition, can lead to more empirically-based presumptions in antitrust’s
legal standards, and can result in more informed antitrust enforcement.
93

Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek W. Moore, The Future of Behavioral Economics in
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89, 92 (Spring 2010).
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Second, it is debatable whether neoclassical economic theory’s reliance
on the rule-of-reason, has provided the desired level of administrability,
consistency, objectivity, and transparency to antitrust.94

The Supreme

Court’s current rule-of-reason standard provides little predictability to
market participants, and, in combination with class action mechanisms,
subjects litigants and trial courts to the purgatory of “sprawling, costly, and
hugely time consuming” discovery.95

The Court’s alternative per se

standard is also unsatisfactory for evaluating many ordinary competitive
restraints: the risk of false positives counsels against expanding rules of per
se illegality, while the risk of false negatives counsels against expanding
predictability through rules of per se legality.
As Justice Breyer observed in Leegin, “antitrust law cannot, and should
not precisely replicate economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views.”96
Instead, for legal standards in the antitrust context to serve their goals of
prohibiting anticompetitive conduct while not sweeping in procompetitive
conduct, they must be as precise as possible. The insights from behavioral
economics can facilitate that end by providing agencies, courts, and
legislatures with an additional lens through which to understand the facts
before them. In some contexts, courts will conclude that the rule of reason
is the best option. But, it may also mean that in other contexts, lawmakers
will take all of the available empirical economic evidence and create legally
rebuttable presumptions.97 As we discuss infra, behavioral economics can
play an important role in that endeavor by explaining how actual real-world
94

Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009).
95
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 n.6.
96
Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887, 914-15 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
97
Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally
Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason,” 2 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 215, 219 (2006); Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV.
28, 41 (1953).
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evidence that contradicts (or is unexplainable under) a neoclassical
economic theory may nevertheless be insightful in understanding whether
conduct is pro- or anti-competitive.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN ANTITRUST LAW
Although behavioral economics, as Part I discusses, has become a
growth stock, this Part discusses how the assumption of rational, selfinterested profit-maximizers became and remains embedded in antitrust
policy.
A. The Chicago School’s Assumption of Rationality
When Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws, it neither endorsed
the assumption of a rational profit-maximizer, nor dictated the application
of any particular economic theory.98 Congress instead sought to strike a
balance between (a) providing the courts with sufficient latitude to shape
those laws over time and (b) not giving the courts unfettered discretion to
interpret the antitrust laws so as to advance a particular judge’s ideology.99
For several decades, the Supreme Court utilized a variety of economic
organizing principles in its antitrust jurisprudence.100 Broadly speaking,
98

George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 3 (1982) (noting that a “careful student of the history of economics would have
searched long and on hard . . . the day the Sherman Act was signed . . . for any economist
who had ever recommended the policy of actively combating collusion or monopolization
in the economy at large”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 213, 249-50 (1985) (“legislative histories of the various antitrust laws fail to
exhibit anything resembling a dominant concern for economic efficiency”).
99
See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (noting that Congress “expected the
courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common law tradition”)
(internal citations omitted); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Co., 485 U.S. 717, 732
(1988) (“The Sherman Act . . . invokes the common law itself and not merely the static
content that the common law assigned that term in 1890.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“The legislative history makes it perfectly clear
that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on
common-law tradition.”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940) (noting
that the “vagueness of [the Sherman Act’s] language” left it to the courts to give “content
to the statute”).
100
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937 268 (1990)
(“One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an
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however, in the 30-year period that preceded the Chicago School’s
inception, the Court sought four aims.101
First, the Court generally (but not always) sought a rule that was
administrable for generalist judges.102 With some notable exceptions, the
Court turned to the Sherman Act’s legislative history or common law
precedent as a basis for its rules.103
Second, the Court sought legal rules to enhance predictability. For
example, in devising the thirty percent presumption for mergers, the Court
sought to foster business autonomy: unless business executives “can assess
the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound business
planning is retarded.”104 The Court’s role was to provide clearer rules on
what was civilly (and criminally) illegal under the Sherman Act.
Third, the Court sought to prevent the lower courts from being bogged
down in difficult economic problems, such as trade-offs between inter- and
intra-brand competition.105 Neither the courts nor litigants could weigh the
reduction of competition in one area (such as intra-brand competition for
Topco private-label products among Topco member supermarkets) versus
greater competition in another area (such as inter-brand competition
between

Topco

members’

private-label

supermarkets’ private-label goods).

products

and

the

major

106

‘economic approach to antitrust problems only in the 1970’s. At most, this ‘evolution’ in
antitrust policy represented a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been forged
by economic ideology since its inception.”); see also William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro,
Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000)
(surveying the role of economics in antitrust since the Sherman Act’s inception).
101
Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 94, at 1401-06.
102
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362 (“in any case in which it is possible, without
doing violence to the congressional objective embodied in . . . [the statute], to simplify the
test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and practical judicial
administration”).
103
Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 94, at 1402-03.
104
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362.
105
Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 94, at 1404-05.
106
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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Fourth, not only was this weighing beyond its competence, the Court
recognized that the legislature, while subject to rent-seeking, was more
politically accountable than the judiciary; so Congress must make these
normative trade-offs.107
The Court’s implementation of these principles resulted in a period of
unprecedented victories for antitrust enforcement. In the collusion context,
the Court used per se tests to condemn a broad range of conduct including
tying arrangements that conditioned the sale of one product upon the
buyer’s agreement to purchase a second product,108 non-price vertical
restraints through which a manufacturer limited its resalers to specific
geographic areas,109 and the adoption of exclusive sales territories by
marketing joint ventures.110 In the merger context, in its 1963 decision in
Philadelphia National Bank, the Court aimed for a presumption consistent
with the Congressional concerns in the 1950 Clayton Act amendments to
deal with the rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy. The Court sought a presumptively anticompetitive post-merger
market share that was based on figures in its earlier Clayton Act contractintegration cases that was also consistent with prevailing scholarly
opinion.111 The Court also, however, placed horizontal mergers creating
market shares below 10 percent in question.112
As scholars have noted, “[t]here was considerable consistency between
judicial decisions and economic thinking during the 1940s, 1950s, and
107

Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 94, at 1405-6.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
109
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
110
Topco, 405 U.S. 596.
111
Id. at 365-66.
112
United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (enjoining a merger
between two Los Angeles grocery chains with no more than 7.5 percent of retail sales);
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966) (blocking a merger between
two brewing firms that together accounted for 24 percent of beer sales in Wisconsin, 11
percent of sales in a three-state area of the upper Midwest, and less than 5 percent of sales
nationally, holding that the Clayton Act was violated “in each and all of these three areas”).
108
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1960s.”113 But that consistency did not, in the eyes of the Court’s critics,
provide the doctrinal certitude that antitrust law required. Beginning in the
mid-1970s, the Chicago School’s neoclassical economic theories began to
serve that role.114
Although the “basic features of the Chicago [S]chool of antitrust
analysis are attributable to the work of Aaron Director in the 1950s,”115
Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox116 is widely considered to have laid the
foundation for the Chicago School’s incorporation into federal antitrust law.
Judge Bork argued that contrary to early thinking, the Sherman Act’s
legislative history “displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of
promoting consumer welfare,” a term which Bork gave a different meaning
than others.117 As the Chicago School recognized, defining the goal of
antitrust is paramount. This is because “[e]verything else follows from the
answer we give.”118 So to make the rule of reason “more manageable,” the
Chicago School adopted the position “that the essential spirit of the Rule is
to condemn only those practices that are, on balance, inefficient in the
economic sense.”119
The Chicago School next elevated the importance of the rationality
assumption. Although Posner once said that the “basic tenet of the Chicago
113

See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 52.
For a detailed discussion of the rise of the Chicago School, see Kovacic & Shapiro,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 52-55; Stucke, Behavioral, supra
note 62, at 537-44.
115
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979); see generally Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade
Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956).
116
BORK, supra note 3.
117
Id. at 61 (arguing that the overriding policy goal behind Sherman Act is consumer
welfare and that Congress intended to accomplish that end by protecting economic
efficiency). Bork’s interpretation was so roundly discredited that some have called for a
halt of its bashing. See Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
879, 882 (1990).
118
BORK, supra note 3, at 50.
119
Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1977).
114
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school” is that “problems of competition and monopoly should be analyzed
using the tools of general economic theory,”120 economists disagree on what
those tools are. So the Chicago School differentiated itself by starting
“from the strong assumption that market participants are rational profit
maximizers.”121

Adopting this presumption allowed Chicago School

theorists to more easily predict how rational profit-maximizers should act.
A key component in the Chicago School’s thinking is not that rational
decision-making leads to perfect decision-making, but that markets are selfcorrecting and will counteract faulty decision-making. Except for the rare
cases of price-fixing, mergers to monopoly, or other sustained market
failures,122 government intervention is often seen as unnecessary and
harmful. The Chicago School’s theories do not treat firm behavior any
differently from individuals’ collective behavior.
As Posner, Federal Trade Commissioner William Kovacic, and others
have noted, it is inaccurate to say that the emphasis modern federal antitrust
law has placed on neoclassical economics is solely attributable to the
Chicago School.123 Nevertheless, whether characterized as Chicago, postChicago,124 or Harvard125 School theory, antitrust’s economic theories for
120

Id. at 933-34.
Posner, supra note 115, at 933-34 (explaining that neoclassical theories rely on the
“basic tenet” that “problems of competition and monopoly should be analyzed using the
tools of general economic theory,” including, chiefly, the core theoretical assumption that
individuals are perfectly rational, profit-maximizing decision makers); see also AREEDA
&.HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 137 (“Business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit
maximizers”).
122
Posner, supra note 115, at 933.
123
Kovacic, supra note 5, at 109; Posner, supra note 115, at 931 (concluding that,
because of the convergence between the Harvard and Chicago Schools’ thinking, “it is no
longer worth talking about different schools of academic antitrust analysis”); see also
Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911,
1918-20 (2009) (discussing overlap among Chicago, post-Chicago, and Harvard Schools).
124
The post-Chicago approach, which uses game theory to examine ways in which
established firms behave strategically in comparison to actual and potential rivals, has
supplied a well-developed body of literature that highlights a broader view of predatory
pricing and predatory and exclusionary behavior more generally. Under the post-Chicago
121
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the past thirty years have largely assumed rational profit-maximizing
market participants with willpower.
B. How the Rationality, Profit Maximization, and Efficiency Assumptions
Permeate Modern Federal Antitrust Law
As a result of the Chicago School’s “powerful simplifications,” such as
“rationality, profit maximization, the downward sloping demand curve”126
neoclassical economic principles now underlie much of modern federal
antitrust law and pervade the doctrinal analysis that governs Section 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act as well as merger review.
In the Section 1 context, which involves unreasonable restraints of
trade, the Chicago School’s rational choice theories played a central role in
the Supreme Court’s shift from its per se to its rule-of-reason standard.127
In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,128 the Court overturned United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,129 and held that non-price vertical
restraints were subject to the rule of reason. Then in State Oil Co. v.
Khan,130 the Court discarded its per se ban on maximum resale price
maintenance agreements. Citing Posner’s Seventh Circuit decision, Bork’s

School work, firms with substantial market power can engage in exclusionary conduct by
raising their rivals’ cost. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.
J. 209 (1986).
125
Kovacic, supra note 123, at 170 (noting that Harvard School, through the
contributions of Donald Turner, Phillip Areeda, and Justice Stephen Breyer, “had as much
to do as Chicago with creating many of the widely-observed presumptions and precautions
that disfavor intervention by U.S. courts and enforcement agencies”); see also Einer
Elhauge, Harvard Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme Court
Decisions?, 3 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 2, Autumn (2007).
126
Posner, supra note 115, at 931.
127
Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago
School’s Influence on Antitrust, GCP (Global Competition Policy) MAG. 7, Apr. 15, 2009
(“Perhaps the Chicago School’s most important and visible victory has been the assault on
the per se rule of illegality, which, at least for now, exists only in naked price-fixing cases
and, in a weakened form, in tying cases.”).
128
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
129
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
130
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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Antitrust Paradox, and Areeda and Hovenkamp’s treatise,131 the Court
reasoned that a per se rule was inappropriate where “a considerable body of
scholarship” suggested maximum resale price maintenance agreements
were procompetitive and provided “insufficient economic justification for
per se invalidation” of those agreements.132

More recently, in Leegin

Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc.,133 the Court overruled its nearly
century-old per se rule against vertical minimum price-fixing.134 The Court
again turned to the thinking of the Harvard and Chicago Schools and cited
as authority an amicus brief by several economists to support the
proposition that “authorities in the economics literature suggest the per se
rule is inappropriate, and there is now widespread agreement that resale
price maintenance can have procompetitive effects.”135
The departure from per se rules has its roots in the Chicago School’s
belief that the false negatives (and administrative costs) that result from the
Court’s rule-of-reason standard are far less significant than the false
positives that follow from its per se rules. False negatives are not a concern
if one strongly believes in self-correcting markets arising from selfinterested rational market participants. Instead the greater concern is that
government restraints (in the form of per se rules or legal presumptions of
illegality) represent a greater threat to market efficiency.
Nevertheless, while embracing its rule-of-reason standard, the Court

131

P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW (1989) & P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW (1988 Supp.).
132
522 U.S. at 15, 18.
133
Leegin, 551 U.S. 887.
134
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
135
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900 (citing Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007)).
See also Elhauge, supra note 125 (arguing that, while the Chicago School would have
advocated for a rule of per se legality in the context of vertical restraints, the Court’s
adoption of the rule of reason demonstrates that the Court followed the teachings of the
Harvard School).
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has, more recently, complained of antitrust’s “interminable litigation,”136
“inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase,”137 the risk of “frivolous”
suits,138 and the “unusually” high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust
courts.139 So the current Court, like the earlier Warren and Burger Courts,
lacks confidence in the judiciary’s ability to examine difficult economic
problems. But rather than provide more guidance for courts reviewing
antitrust violations under Section 1, the Court now requires the lower courts
to undertake a complex economic rule-of-reason analysis with relatively
little concrete guidance.
Put differently, the importation of the neoclassical ideas in construing
Section 1 has the left the Court in an awkward position. On the one hand,
the Court has relied on the Chicago School’s organizing principles to
introduce increased complexity in the law: if neoclassical economic theory
suggests bright-line rules are prohibiting procompetitive conduct, the
Court’s response has been to expand the rule of reason. On the other hand,
the Court has resorted to the Chicago School’s principles as a justification
for simplifying antitrust law by placing the upmost weight on
administrability and predictability when creating bright-line rules that
essentially immunize conduct deemed economically irrational.
The Court’s construction of monopolization claims under Section 2
likewise has shifted as a result of the Chicago School’s influence,
particularly in the predatory pricing context where the Court has crafted
liability rules that are premised on the assumption that firms behave
rationally. Under neoclassical thinking, predation claims specifically and

136

Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414 (2004).
137
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966, 1967 n.6 (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm.,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
138
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895.
139
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2395 (2007).
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attempted monopolization claims generally are highly unusual in the
presence of low entry barriers and rational market participants. For any
attempted monopolization claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that entry
barriers in the relevant market are “significant” and “substantial” enough to
confer monopoly power.140

Notwithstanding the firm’s intent to

monopolize a market and its anticompetitive conduct, the court could find
that rational profit-maximizing entrants will materialize and rescue the
consumer. Similarly no rational firm would engage in predation given the
difficulty of recouping its losses.141 This reasoning led Frank Easterbrook
in 1981 to opine that “there is no sufficient reason for antitrust law or the
courts to take predation seriously.”142 This view has largely carried the day
at the Supreme Court.143
In Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,144 for example,
the Court observed a “consensus among” Chicago School “commentators
that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful.” The Court adopted Bork’s view in The Antitrust Paradox that
“[a]ny agreement to price below the competitive level requires the
conspirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them,” and,
as such, “[f]or the investment to be rational, the conspirators must have a
reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits,
more than the losses suffered.”145
140

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 145 (“Any realistic theory of predation recognizes
that the predator as well as his victims will incur losses during the fighting, but such a
theory supposes it may be a rational calculation for the predator to view the losses as an
investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals are to be killed) or in future
undisturbed profits (where rivals are to be disciplined).”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981).
142
Id. at 264.
143
Leslie, supra note 33, at 289-91.
144
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
145
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89 (citing R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 145
(1978)).
141
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Likewise, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation146 (which Bork successfully argued), the Court relied on
Matsushita and the writings of various prominent Harvard and Chicago
School scholars to declare that conduct will not amount to predatory pricing
unless (1) the alleged scheme involved pricing below some measure of cost
and (2) the predator had a rational prospect of recouping its losses from
such below-cost predation.147

Consistent with the wealth-maximizing

assumptions that underlie both schools of thought, the Court observed that
“[r]ecoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing
scheme.”148

Most recently in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons

Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc.,149 the Court applied its Brooke Group test to
claims of predatory bidding. “Without such a reasonable expectation” of
recoupment, the Court wrote, “a rational firm would not willingly suffer
definite, short-run losses.”150 Given the risks in recoupment, a “rational
business will rarely make this sacrifice.”151
But the Court’s reliance on rational choice theory in Brooke Group and
Weyerhaeuser is inconsistent with its recoupment requirement. The Court’s
premise is that firms are rational and self-interested.

If true, firms

ordinarily would price their products at or above their marginal cost.
Rational firms, Bork believed, would rarely if ever incur the substantial
losses in pricing below marginal cost, unless they believed that the future
supra-competitive profits, appropriately discounted, would exceed the
immediate losses.152 So if rational profit-maximizing firms were pricing
below marginal cost, this reveals their reasonable expectation of
146

509 U.S. 209 (1993).
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224.
148
Id.
149
549 U.S. 312 (2007).
150
Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 319.
151
Id. at 323.
152
BORK, supra note 3, at 145.

147
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recoupment. Under rational choice theory, the antitrust plaintiff should
recover simply by proving that defendant’s prices were below marginal
cost.153 But the Court requires antitrust plaintiffs to separately prove a
reasonable expectation of recoupment.

This second element provides

antitrust defendants another opportunity to avoid liability. Even if pricing
below marginal cost, defendant could argue that entry barriers are
sufficiently low, so that rational profit-maximizers would defeat any
attempted exercise of market power.

If true, defendant, under rational

choice theory, should not have priced below marginal cost in the first place.
Although the Court has not adopted the Chicago School’s view of per se
legality for predatory pricing,154 its rule essentially immunizes conduct
deemed economically irrational.155
Apart from the Sherman Act, the neoclassical economic theories’
rationality assumption has influenced U.S. merger law. Some described the
1982 Merger Guidelines as “a product of the new economic orientation in

153

One could argue that imposing the second element of recoupment serves to
minimize the costs of false positives from the first element, namely the court’s attempt in
determining the product’s “appropriate measure of cost.” But if this were driving the
Court’s concern, then it would have specified what constitutes the appropriate measure of
cost (such as average variable cost) which raises its own issues. See Russell Pittman, Who
Are You Calling Irrational? Marginal Costs, Variable Costs, and the Pricing Practices of
Firms, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 09-3 (July 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/248394a.htm.
154
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant
Firm in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 109, 110 (Robert Pitofsky ed.
2009) (characterizing Brooke Group as a victory for the Harvard School because the Court
adopted the view that predatory pricing could be illegal provided there was an opportunity
for recoupment).
155
The Tenth Circuit noted in the government’s most recent predatory pricing case,
“[r]ecent scholarship has challenged the notion that predatory pricing schemes are
implausible and irrational.” United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (10th
Cir. 2003) (citing Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal
Policy, 88 GEO L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) (“[M]odern economic analysis has developed
coherent theories of predation that contravene earlier economic writing claiming that
predatory pricing conduct is irrational.”)). The Tenth Circuit, while approaching the DOJ’s
predatory pricing claims “with caution,” did “not do so with the incredulity that once
prevailed.” AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1115. The DOJ still lost, however. Id. at 1120–21.
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antitrust law, if not an outright product of Chicago School economic
theories.”156 These principles can be seen in two respects.
First, in response to critiques by Bork and others from the Chicago and
Harvard Schools that the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm
prohibited mergers among small firms that could generate efficiencies, the
agencies allowed for a more fulsome consideration of efficiencies in the
1982 Guidelines.157
Second, consistent with the Court’s decision in General Dynamics158 the
1982 Guidelines embraced the neoclassical idea that, concentration ratios
notwithstanding, a firm’s market share may not accurately reflect the firm’s
long-term competitive viability.

Thus, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

(HHI) serves to reduce the risk of false positives by creating what are
generally viewed as “safe harbors.” If a merger’s HHI (a measure of the
industry concentration that will result from the merger)159 falls within those
safe harbors, the merger is typically not challenged. On the other hand,
high market shares post-merger in highly concentrated industries are
insufficient.
156

The antitrust agencies must still prove a compelling

Herbert Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 937, 947 n.43
(1984); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Introduction: The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When
Economists are Kings? 71 CAL. L. REV. 281 (1983) (stating that the 1982 Merger
Guidelines represent “a new positivism; a reduction of legal principles to a simple, unitary,
quasi-scientific, outcome-oriented economic model that, in a generalized sense, has been
offered as the model for solving all antitrust problems. By embodying only one substantive
goal – allocative efficiency – the model offers the appearance of clarity, predictability, and
reduced government intervention”).
157
See BORK, supra note 3, at 217. During his tenure as Assistant Attorney General,
Donald Turner of the Harvard School asked Oliver Williamson to study the issue which
resulted in a paper showing the economic irrationality of merger policy that did not take
efficiencies into account. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1969). Williamson’s paper, in turn, led to the
inclusion of a narrow efficiencies defense in the first Merger Guidelines which the 1982
Merger Guidelines revisions more fully embraced and expanded on.
158
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
159
HHIs are derived by summing the squares of each competitor’s market share. The
first important variable is the industry’s HHI post-merger. The second important variable
is the change in HHI, namely the number of points, by which the merger increases the
market’s HHI. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 32, at §6.3.
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competitive effects story (namely how this merger significantly increases
the risk of coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive effects), and why the
exercise of market power won’t be squelched by the entry (or expansion) of
rational profit-maximizing firms.
In short, since the Chicago School’s ascendance in the mid 1970s,
antitrust law has embraced neoclassical principles at every turn. While
these principles may have been motivated by the desire to increase
predictability (and, in turn, fewer false positives), it is not altogether clear
that the neoclassical antitrust theories led to those results. In some cases,
the desire to subject conduct to a rule-of-reason framework so as not to
prohibit procompetitive conduct decreased predictability.

As discussed

below, the behavioral economics literature provides insights into ways to
further sharpen antitrust rules to result in fewer false positives and false
negatives over the long run.
III. HOW CAN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS INFORM ANTITRUST POLICIES?
As the survey in Part II suggests, neoclassical economic theory now
covers the landscape in federal antitrust law. When the antitrust agencies
and federal courts analyze anticompetitive conduct or evaluate a proposed
or consummated merger, they generally apply certain assumptions about
firm and individual behavior, including: (i) markets characterized with low
entry barriers do not pose antitrust concerns; these markets are not
susceptible to the prolonged exercise of market power because rational
profit-maximizers will enter; (ii) many mergers generate significant
efficiencies; (iii) rational big buyers often thwart the exercise of market
power; and (iv) general deterrence of cartels is achievable under optimal
deterrence theory.
These assumptions – which are based on the tenets of neoclassical
economic theory of plausible behavior – can and do have outcomedeterminative effects. Federal courts regularly grant defendants’ summary
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judgment motions if plaintiffs’ antitrust claims do not make “economic
sense,” such as alleging economically irrational (non-profit-maximizing)
behavior.160

Now Twombly has opened the door for defendants at the

pleading stage to argue that plaintiffs’ antitrust claims are economically
implausible.161

Similarly, “[c]urrent U.S. merger enforcement policy,”

reported the Antitrust Modernization Commission, “is premised on
assumptions about how concentration and other market characteristics (such
as ease of entry) affect competition and market power.”162 The problem the
AMC identified is that the “[e]mpirical evidence gives only limited support
for these assumptions.”163 As one former antitrust official observed, the
agencies’ “merger review process is applied sparingly” as the “vast majority
of transactions” (approximately 97 percent) “are cleared within the initial
waiting period.”164
This is all to say that assumptions play a critical role in winnowing the
types of conduct that go to discovery and/or trial as well as the number of
mergers that the antitrust agencies actually review as potentially anticompetitive. If the assumptions are infirm, then conceivably some of the
conduct that is exonerated and the mergers that are not reviewed may be
anticompetitive.

160

Leslie, supra note 33, at 272 (noting plaintiff’s two-step rationality burden); see
also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467 (1992) (summary
judgment is appropriate where antitrust claim “simply makes no economic sense”) (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 594 n.19, 596-97
(1986)); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, J.) (arguing that summary judgment for defendants is proper even if there is
some evidence of an antitrust violation, if plaintiff's theory makes no economic sense).
161
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
162
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6162
(April
2007),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf
163
Id. at 62.
164
Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Merger Review: A Quest for Efficiency (Jan. 25, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/221173.htm.
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A. Assumption that Rational Profit-maximizers Will Defeat the Exercise of
Market Power in Markets Characterized with Low Entry Barriers
Neoclassical antitrust analysis treats the potential for entry as significant
– if not sometimes dispositive – in determining whether the existing market
participants will exercise market power. The analysis assumes that markets
characterized with low entry barriers are not susceptible to the prolonged
exercise of market power because (1) supra-competitive prices will attract
rational profit-maximizing firms, (2) these new entrants will replenish the
lost output, and (3) as a result of entry, prices will return closer to marginal
cost.
With the exception of criminal prosecutions of cartels,165 this
assumption pervades the Sherman Act case law. In the Section 1 context,
courts have observed that the absence of entry barriers means a predatory
pricing conspiracy is implausible. In Matsushita, plaintiffs argued that they
had adduced facts to show a plausible conspiracy to engage in predatory
pricing. The Supreme Court, however, observed that the antitrust plaintiffs
“offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant market is especially
difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to
maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time.”166
Likewise, in the Section 2 context, for Bork and others, monopolies
(other than those protected by the government) are short-term phenomena:
the innovator’s supra-competitive profits serve as bait for imitators, who
“first reduce and then annihilate [the monopolist’s] profit,” which reverts to
the competitive mean.167

Innovation attracts imitation, which leads to

commoditization. Courts therefore will frequently analyze whether a firm
165

One success by DOJ prosecutors is in preserving the Court’s per se rule on
horizontal price-fixing, bid-rigging, market or customer allocations, or output reductions.
If executives conspire to fix prices, they are liable even though entry barriers are low or
such behavior is economically irrational.
166
475 U.S. at 591 n.15.
167
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 89 (1934);
BORK, supra note 3, at 195-97.
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can attempt to monopolize, or monopolize, a market by examining the
likelihood of entry.168
Entry barriers are also a key factor under the Merger Guidelines. The
federal antitrust agencies lost a series of merger challenges when courts
found that easy entry would deter any anticompetitive effects.169 The
agencies thereafter adopted a more extensive entry provision in their
Guidelines, which set forth what the agencies believe is required for entry to
be “timely, likely, and sufficient to deter or counteract anticompetitive
effects.”170

Merger analysis for the agencies “generally entails a

hypothetical analysis of entry.”171 In markets where entry theoretically
would be timely (i.e., occurring in less than two years), likely, and sufficient
in magnitude, character and scope to deter the exercise of market power,
then the “merger is not likely to enhance market power.” For mergers
subject to a Second Request between the years 1996 and 2003, the FTC
stated that it took no enforcement action where its staff concluded that entry
would be timely, likely, and sufficient under the Merger Guidelines
criteria.172
When the antitrust agencies believe that entry barriers are sufficiently
168

See, e.g., AD/SAT v. AP, 181 F.3d 216, 229 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant on attempted monopolization claim and noting that the presence of
“low barriers to market entry” suggested that the defendant would “face significant
competition from new entrants”); Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant in Robinson Patman Act case where plaintiff
failed to show the presence of entry barriers and noting that “the ease or difficulty of entry”
is “[t]he most significant structural factor bearing on the ability to recoup predatory losses
through inflated prices” because “[w]here a market has low barriers to entry, sellers
charging supracompetitive prices will soon attract new competitors, sellers charging
supracompetitive prices will soon attract new competitors”).
169
AMC Report, supra note 162, at 71 n. 40.
170
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 32, at § 9.0
171
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission: The
Horizontal
Merger
Review
Process
14
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/02/0502economicissues.pdf.
172
Id. at 78 (noting that of the 19 cases identified, 16 were in highly concentrated
industries).
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low to defeat the exercise of market power post-merger, there is typically no
mechanism to minimize the risk of false negatives. Private parties and the
state attorneys general infrequently challenge mergers.173

On the other

hand, if the agencies believe that entry barriers are sufficiently high to
enable the exercise of market power, mechanisms exist to reduce the risk of
false positives. The merging parties can seek to persuade a generalist court
(which is less familiar about these antitrust issues than the agencies) that a
hypothetical rational entrant would defeat the exercise of market power.
The Section 7 case law is consistent with this approach: the merging parties
can use evidence of low entry barriers to successfully rebut any
presumption of anticompetitive harm. “In the absence of significant
barriers,” the courts assume, “a company probably cannot maintain
supracompetitive pricing for any length of time.”174
The problem is that our understanding regarding the impact of ease of
entry on competition is, as the AMC found, “limited.”175 The behavioral
literature identifies two market-entry error types: (1) excess entry (i.e.,
entry that fails because it is economically irrational), and (2) sparse entry
(i.e., entry that should but does not occur because a firm exhibits

173

Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review:
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 171-72.
174
Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d at 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The existence and
significance of barriers to entry are frequently, of course, crucial considerations in a
rebuttal analysis.”); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119-20 n.15
(1986) (recognizing that “without barriers to entry into the market it would presumably be
impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time”); United States v.
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) (easy entry would eliminate any
anticompetitive impact of merger in highly concentrated industry); United States v. Syufy
Enter., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990) (“If there are no significant barriers to entry ...
any attempt to raise prices above the competitive level will lure into the market new
competitors able and willing to offer their commercial goods or personal services for
less.”); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 54-55 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that
ease of entry can be sufficient to offset the government’s prima facie case of
anticompetitiveness).
175
AMC Report, supra note 162, at 62.
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irrationality in failing to pursue entry).176 Both categories of market-entry
error can cast light on ways in which antitrust law’s assumptions about
entry are imperfect.
Excess Entry. Entry occurs in some industries when it is economically
irrational. Indeed, some industries “see perennially high rates of entry,
increase[d] competition, and high rates of failure.”177

The behavioral

economics and behavioral finance literature offers at least three possible
explanations for this tendency.
One explanation is the “optimism bias” or “positivity illusion.”178 The
notion is that when individuals judge their likelihood of experiencing a
good outcome in an event that they have some control over – obtaining a
favorable job, financial security, or marriage – they overestimate their
likelihood of success.179

In contrast, when individuals estimate the

probability that something negative will happen to them – a car accident
from reckless driving, a loss in the stock market, or divorce – they
underestimate its likelihood.
Economists Camerer and Lovallo have shown that this optimism bias
carries over to entry decision-making.180 Their work found that, while
participants in a given market may correctly realize that the average
entrant’s profit would be negative, the individual participants will
incorrectly expect that their own profits will be positive. Moreover, their
work found that optimism bias is most pronounced in situations they

176

Don A. Moore et al., What Competition? Myopic Self-focus in Market-entry
Decisions, 18 ORG. SCI. 440, 441 (2007).
177
Moore et al., supra note 176, at 440.
178
See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and
Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 505-08 (2002) (discussing the principle of
overconfidence in the context of entry decision-making).
179
Moore et al., supra note 176, at 440-41.
180
Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999).
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describe as “reference group neglect,”181 where the potential entrant
believes it has a particular expertise or skill in the given market – even
where the entrant knows that its competitors believe that they have a special
skill. There “is more entry when people are betting on their own relative
skill rather than on a random device” and “[t]he more surprising finding is
that overconfidence is even stronger when subjects self-select into the
experimental sessions, knowing their success will depend partly on their
skill (and that others have self-selected too).”182
A second and related explanation is that entrants may be driven by the
desirability bias. Desirability bias (or “wishful thinking”) is the tendency of
individuals to predict favorable outcomes in external events that they have
no control over, but whose outcomes nevertheless implicate their selfperception.183 Such errant predictions may occur if entrants (i) overestimate
the likelihood that a market participant (or participants) will fail or (ii)
underestimate the likelihood of events in the economy that will negatively
affect their prospects of success. In terms of antitrust, a party entering a
market with low entry barriers could overestimate the likelihood that it
would obtain the financing to succeed over the long run or underestimate
the likelihood that new entrants against whom it will compete for market
share will succeed. As Professor Avishalom Tor, who has extensively
written in the area of behavioral antitrust, has observed “entrants who
overestimate their prospects are more likely to fail than entrants who make
accurate average estimates, but their presence also decreases other entrants’
probability of success and changes the composition of the final cohort of
181

Id. at 315.
Id. at 310-16.
183
See Robert A. Olsen, Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers:
Some Evidence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISIONMAKING 65, 65 (1997) (defining
desirability bias as “the tendency to overpredict desirable outcomes and underpredict
unwanted outcomes”); see also Tor, supra note 178, at 508-510, 515-516 (discussing the
application of desirability bias to entry in the antitrust context).
182
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successful entrants.”184
A third and related bias is when entrants’ focus on themselves rather
than understanding competition.

One qualitative field study of

entrepreneurs found that those who started their own businesses thought
about their personal abilities, but “rarely mentioned external factors such as
the capacity of the market they were entering or the strength of their
competitors.”185 Thus entrants over-enter markets they perceive as easy for
them (such as restaurants), and do not research the external environment or
competition.186
Sparse Entry. At other times, entry does not occur when it is
economically rational.

Thus companies can maintain supracompetitive

pricing in markets with low entry barriers. Between 1988 and 1996, the
DOJ prosecuted criminally cartels in dozens of industries that, on the
surface, appear to have moderate or low entry barriers, including turtles,
chain link fences, and bicycle retailers.187 Other recent cartels involved
college textbooks,188 packaged ice,189 scrap metal,190 bid rigging at public
real estate foreclosure auctions,191 and retail gasoline and diesel fuel.192 The
184

Tor, supra note 178, at 532.
Moore et al., supra note 176, at 441.
186
Id. at 444.
187
See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 62, at 565-66 (collecting cases revealing price-fixing
in markets that superficially, at least, appear to have moderate or low entry barriers).
188
United States v. Dennis L. Saner and Harold E. Vogel, No. IP 03181-CR (S.D. Ind.
filed Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201500/201507.pdf.
189
United States v. Home City Ice Co., Criminal No. CR-1-07-140 (S.D. Oh. filed
Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f234200/234205.htm.
190
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Cleveland Scrap Metal Dealer and Owner
Indicted
in
Antitrust
Conspiracy
(Feb.
6,
2008),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/229926.htm (conspiracy involved
industrial scrap metal dealers who generally place collection boxes at manufacturers' sites
to collect scrap metal, then pick it up, process it, and resell it to customers).
191
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, California Real Estate Executive Pleads Guilty
to
Bid
Rigging
(Apr.
16,
2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/257801.htm.
192
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Convenience Store Company and Individual
Charged with Retail Gasoline Price Fixing in Oklahoma (Sept. 19, 2008),
185
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behavioral economics literature offers two possible explanations for the
absence of entry in these markets.
One explanation is that, while information is available, individuals do
not react to risk or uncertainty as a rational profit-maximizer would. The
Efficient Market Hypothesis, like rational choice theory generally, assumes
that so long as information is publically available, rational profitmaximizing traders will enter financial markets if there are irrational price
moves to maintain market efficiency.193 Thus, under the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, stocks are consistently priced at a “rational” level: stock prices
of actively traded companies quickly adjust to reflect the rational
expectations generated by information as it becomes available.194 As recent
events have proven (and as the behavioral finance literature shows), rational
arbitrageurs do not, however, always exploit obvious fiscal opportunities to
restore prices to their fundamental value.195

The behavioral finance

literature also suggests that sparse entry may result from the fact that the
information needed to make a rational decision about entry can be costly to
acquire, process, and verify.196
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/237430.htm.
193
NICHOLAS BARBERIS & RICHARD THALER, A SURVEY OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, IN
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 15 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005); see also Stucke,
supra note 62, at 569-70.
194
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770-72 (1985) (explaining the efficient
market hypothesis); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 646-48 (1995) (describing
concept of the efficient market hypothesis in modern financial theory); see also Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 554-65 (1984) (detailing principles of market efficiency).
195
For an account of the rise and fall of the efficient market hypothesis, see FOX, supra
note 8.
196
Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanism of Market Inefficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 637-55
(2003) (noting that because information is costly to obtain, process, and verify, “it is
impossible for every participant in securities markets to actually acquire, understand, and
validate all the available information that might be relevant in valuing securities”); see also
Frederick Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 455 (2006) (discussing examples where arbitrage should occur in financial
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A second explanation for sparse entry is the flipside of the
overconfidence bias: while people are overconfident with respect to easy
tasks, they rate themselves well below average on difficult tasks. So rates
of entry, in one behavioral experiment, differed dramatically for difficult
and simple tasks. In the experiment, participants over-entered when the
quiz was simple (69% of the time), but less often on rounds when the quiz
was difficult (39% of the time), even though they stood to profit in entering
the difficult rounds.197 There was no evidence that the university students
learned to avoid these mistakes over 12 rounds.198 In basing entry largely
on their myopic judgment, the participants failed to see profitable
opportunities where less competition existed.
These insights from the behavioral literature suggest that hypothetical
entry barriers are only part of understanding entry. At times, some proclaim
to the antitrust agencies that they would enter in response to a small but
significant nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP). Accurately predicting
an entrant’s success, however, requires a more complete understanding of
the biases that skew the entrant’s wealth maximization calculus. At other
times, even if entry barriers are low, entry will not occur despite the profit
opportunity.

A more fulsome entry analysis should therefore consider

factors apart from entry barriers, such as: (i) why entry does not occur in
markets when antitrust’s economic theory predicts it would, (ii) why do
others enter markets when economically irrational, and (iii) assessing a
prospective entrant’s likelihood of success with the recognition that its
optimism may bias its outlook.
B. Assumption that Companies Merge to Generate Significant Efficiencies
Antitrust policy assumes that companies often merge to obtain

markets, but did not).
197
Moore et al., supra note 176, at 449.
198
Id. at 450.
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efficiencies. “All of us know,” one Bush antitrust official remarked, “that
the rationale for most mergers is procompetitive and that most mergers have
no adverse effects on competition.”199 Some noted that the change from the
1960s is “more than anything else . . . the perception that many, if not most,
mergers are efficiency-enhancing, a fact that has come to the forefront with
the need to permit American firms to be competitive in international
markets.”200 The antitrust agencies believe that “[t]he vast majority of
mergers pose no harm to consumers, and many produce efficiencies that
benefit consumers in the form of lower prices, higher quality goods or
services, or investments in innovation.”201

The belief is that profit-

maximizing firms merge to generate efficiencies and/or to achieve market
power. If the merger generates neither, it is economically irrational.
The Merger Guidelines likewise state that the “a primary benefit of
mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies
and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which
may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new
products”202

Although the Merger Guidelines treat efficiencies as a

defense, the merging parties can use efficiencies to explain why the merger
will unlikely lead to coordinated effects, i.e., the efficiencies will reduce the
merged firm’s marginal costs resulting in a “new maverick firm” that has
199

William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S.
Department of Justice, What Is Competition? (Oct. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm.
200
Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the European Union:
Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 305, 328 (2000).
201
Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal
Merger
Guidelines
(March
2006),
available
at
http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm [hereinafter Guidelines Commentary].
202
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 32, at §10; see also 1984 Merger
Guidelines (DOJ “seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with that larger universe of
mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral”). For a detailed account of the
evolution of the efficiencies defense, see William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The
Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal
Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207 (2003).
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less incentive to engage in tacit or express collusion.203 Consequently,
“[t]he Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of
a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be
anticompetitive in any relevant market.”204
At times, the antitrust agencies reject the merging parties’ efficiencies
defense, and no federal court to date has relied on efficiencies in rejecting
the antitrust agencies’ challenge to an otherwise anticompetitive merger.
But efficiencies continue to play a significant role in the agencies’ merger
review. In recent closing statements, for example, the DOJ highlighted the
likely efficiencies from mergers in the highly concentrated telephone,205
satellite radio,206 airline,207 and home appliance208 industries. The DOJ
noted that “one of the key parts” of its investigation of a proposed beer joint
venture was having “verified that the joint venture” between Miller and
Molson Coors was “likely to produce substantial and credible savings that
will significantly reduce the companies' costs of producing and distributing
beer.”209
203

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 32, at §10.
Id. at §10.
205
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Statement by Assistant Attorney General
Thomas O. Barnett Regarding the Closing of the Investigation of AT&T’s Acquisition of
Bellsouth: Investigation Concludes That Combination Would Not Reduce Competition
(Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/218904.pdf.
206
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Statement of the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio
Holdings Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc.: Evidence Does Not Establish that
Combination of Satellite Radio Providers Would Substantially Reduce Competition (March
24, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/231467.pdf.
207
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Statement of the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its Investigation of the Merger of Delta Air
Lines
Inc.
and
Northwest
Airlines
Corporation
(Oct.
29,
2008),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/238849.htm.
208
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Statement on the Closing of its Investigation of Whirlpool’s Acquisition of Maytag (March
29, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/215326.htm.
209
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Statement of the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its Investigation of the Joint Venture between
SABMiller Plc and Molson Coors Brewing Company (June 5, 2008),
204

50

Behavioral Antitrust

[9-Aug-10

Recent changes to the Merger Guidelines in 2007 and 2010 emphasize
that “[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify . . . because much of
the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the
merging firms” and that, “[m]oreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and
in good faith by the merging firms may not be realized.”210 Indeed, in
several notable cases – AOL/Time Warner and Sony/Columbia Pictures to
name a few – the parties fared poorly at predicting poorly the mergers’
likely efficiencies.211 And if the events in the financial sector in the fall of
2008 are any indication, in many of the bank mergers that preceded the
financial crisis, the banks failed to sustain their anticipated growths in
profit.212 As economist F.M. Scherer observed, “making mergers is a risky
proposition” and “perhaps the majority, fail to live up to expectations and
may indeed make matters worse rather than better.”213

For Scherer,

“[m]aking mergers is a form of gambling; skill matters, but there is an
important chance component.”214
The unrealized efficiencies in these cases may have resulted from
incomplete information or unanticipated events (such as an economic
downturn). However, these phantom efficiencies may also be the result of
the biases discussed in the behavioral economics literature.
One explanation is that in competitive settings – such as auctions and
bidding wars – passion may trump reason. Rational choice theory assumes
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/233845.htm.
210
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 32, at §10.
211
See ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE
ASHES (2005) (summarizing major failed mergers); Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time
Warner Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010.
212
See Peter Thal Larsen, Global, universal, unmanageable? Why many are wary of
bank mega mergers, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007 (arguing that the efficiencies from bank
mergers remain unproven) (“Despite a decade of banking mergers, there is no evidence that
big banks are any more efficient or profitable than their smaller rivals.”).
213
F.M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 5, 18 (2001).
214
Id.
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that in an auction, each profit-maximizing bidder assumes that the other
bidders are also rational. In bidding wars (whether for antique furniture or a
multi-million-dollar firm), passion and optimism may prevail, leading
participants to overvalue the purchased assets.
In a recent experiment, neuroscientists and economists combined brain
imaging techniques and behavioral economics research to better understand
why individuals overbid.215 Specifically, they examined whether the fear of
losing the social competition inherent in an auction game causes people to
overpay. Members in the “loss-frame” group were given fifteen dollars at
the beginning of each auction round. If they won the auction for that round,
they would get to keep the fifteen dollars and the payoff from the auction.
If they lost, they would have to return the fifteen dollars. Members in the
“bonus-frame” group, on the other hand, were told that if they won that
auction round they would get a fifteen-dollar bonus at the end of the round.
Whether one gets fifteen dollars at the beginning or end of the auction
round should not affect a rational player: the winner of each round gets
fifteen extra dollars, the loser gets nothing. Nonetheless the loss-treatment
group members outbid the bonus-treatment group members, which outbid
the baseline group.
A second possible explanation is that corporate executives suffer from
“self-attribution bias,” meaning that (fueled by their successes with prior
mergers) they are overconfident in their management skills and believe that
the next merger would yield similar or greater efficiencies. A study of a
sample of public acquisitions that occurred between 1985 and 2002 found
that CEOs who previously engaged in a successful acquisition appear to

215

Mauricio R. Delgado et al., Understanding Overbidding Using the Neural Circuitry
of Reward to Design Economic Auctions, SCIENCE, Sept. 26, 2008, at 1849; see also
THALER, WINNER’S CURSE, supra note 42, at 50-62 (discussing experimental and field
evidence).
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overly attribute their role in successful deals, leading to more deals even
though these subsequent deals are value destructive.216 Moreover, the study
found that CEOs tend to engage in stock purchases that reflect this bias
(engaging in more aggressive stock acquisitions prior to each successive
deal).217
In short, antitrust enforcers do not regularly revisit mergers, so it is
unclear whether the claimed efficiencies actually materialize. Thus one
cannot assume that most mergers are procompetitive.

More empirical

research is needed to determine to what extent close-call mergers generate
significant efficiencies.218 Such research may help identify factors of when,
and under what circumstances, the claimed efficiencies will likely occur.
C. Assumption that Rational Big Buyers Will Thwart the Exercise of
Market Power
Neoclassical economics assumes that cartels are more unstable with big
or “power buyers.” Big buyers use their purchasing power to negotiate a
lower price by playing one cartel member off the other.

If the cartel

members stand firm, the big buyer can take its business to fringe firms
outside of the cartel, sponsor a new entrant by offering non-price perks such
as favorable product placement or more shelf space, or vertically integrate.
Knowing this, rational cartel members likely will defect before the big
buyer fulfills its threat. As Posner said,
216

See, e.g., Matthew T. Billett & Yiming Qian, Are Overconfident CEOs Born or
Made? Evidence of Self Attribution Bias from Frequent Acquirers, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1037
(2008).
217
Id.
218
For the benefits of verifying, after the merger the parties’ ex ante efficiency claims.
See Stucke, supra note 62, at 582; Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States
Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 222-27 (1992) (proposing
enforcement agencies’ conditional clearance of certain mergers subject to post-merger
verification of efficiencies); Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems
in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 26-27 (1993) (stating that post-merger review of efficiencies
equivalent to performance bonding by merging parties verify their assertion that merger
will realize efficiencies).
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The concentration of the buying side of a market does inhibit collusion.
The bigger a buyer is, the more easily and lucratively a member of the
cartel can cheat on his fellows; for with a single transaction, less likely
to be detected than a series of transactions, he may be able to increase
his sales and hence profits dramatically. But with all the members thus
vying for the large orders of big buyers, the cartel will erode.219
Again this assumption is important in weighing the costs of false
positives and negatives.

It is hard to test the degree to which large,

sophisticated buyers reliably defeat the formation and maintenance of tacit
or express collusion. Detecting cartels is difficult by itself. Determining
whether a cartel would have formed but for the presence of a big buyer is
even more difficult. One could study the extent to which cartels carved out
markets with big buyers. But that would not explain how cartels thrived
despite the existence of big buyers.
Support for the power buyer argument has waned in the federal antitrust
agencies.220 But the issue of power buyers still arises in the agencies’
merger review.

In deciding not to challenge Whirlpool Corporation’s

acquisition of Maytag Corporation, for example, the DOJ noted that “the
large retailers through which the majority of these appliances are sold—
Sears, Lowe’s, The Home Depot and Best Buy—have alternatives available
to help them resist an attempt by the merged entity to raise prices.”221
Even when the antitrust agencies believe that power buyers could not
219

Hosp. Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.)
(internal citations omitted). The court, however, noted that the role of the third-party payor
is not quite that of a large buyer since as a practical matter “Blue Cross could not tell its
subscribers in Chattanooga that it will not reimburse them for any hospital services there
because prices are too high.” Id.
220
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 32, at § 8 (“The Agencies consider
the possibility that powerful buyers may constrain the ability of the merging parties to raise
prices. . . . However, the Agencies do not presume that the presence of powerful buyers
alone forestalls adverse competitive effects flowing from the merger.”).
221
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Statement on the Closing of its Investigation of Whirlpool’s Acquisition of Maytag (March
29, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/215326.htm.
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defeat the exercise of market power, a generalist court may disagree.
Although some courts have noted that evidence of power buyers is
insufficient to independently rebut a prima facie case,222 the presence of
power buyers remains an important factor courts consider in evaluating
whether a merger violates Section 7.223
The citric acid cartel is one example. In 1991, a federal district court
judge denied the DOJ’s challenge to Archer-Daniels-Midland's (“ADM”)
long-term lease agreement with a competitor.

The court believed that

ADM’s customers were sufficiently powerful to counteract any non-costbased price hike.224 The court observed that ongoing “consolidation of
buying power [was] an effective means of counteracting any potential
market power that might be exercised by sellers” – an observation that was
“borne out by both economic theory and the facts.”225 The power buyers
had “successfully used a variety of tactics to obtain low prices from [High

222

Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that “courts
have not considered the ‘sophisticated customer’ defense as itself independently adequate
to rebut a prima facie case” and that “the economic argument for even partially rebutting a
presumptive case, because a market is dominated by large buyers, is weak”); Cardinal
Health, 12 F. Supp.2d at 58 (“Although the courts have not yet found that power buyers
alone enable a defendant to overcome the government’s presumption of anticompetitiveness, courts have found that the existence of power buyers can be considered in
their evaluation of an anti-trust case, along with such other factors as the ease of entry and
likely efficiencies.”).
223
See, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999)
(questioning district court’s reliance on the testimony of managed care payers, since
testimony is contrary to their economic interests “and thus is suspect”); Baker Hughes, 908
F.2d at 986 (citing customers’ ability to “closely examine available options and typically
insist on receiving multiple, confidential bids for each order” as evidence that they could
combat any price increase resulting from the mergers); Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d at 670
(“Distributors like Orion have substantial leverage over Syufy and they know it”); United
States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990) (refusing to enjoin a
merger where three large customers accounted for 90 percent of all purchases in the
relevant product market and crediting the customers’ ability to monitor prices closely and
aggressively challenge potential price increases by seeking alternative sources of supply
outside the relevant geographic market).
224
United States v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1416, 1422 (S.D.
Iowa 1991).
225
Id.
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Fructose Corn Syrup (“HFCS”)] suppliers, including playing off suppliers
against one another, swinging volume back and forth among suppliers,
disciplining sellers by cutting them off entirely, successfully insisting on
year long or multi-year tolling agreements, and holding out the threat of
inducing a new entrant into HFCS production.”226 Consequently, “the size
and sophistication of buyers” in the industry was “a powerful ‘other factor’
that strongly mitigates against the possibility of any attempt by . . . suppliers
to raise prices anticompetitively.”227
The DOJ later prosecuted ADM and others for engaging in a cartel
relating to citric acid. “What is particularly ironic is that the perpetrators
and victims [Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble] of the citric acid cartel
included some of the very same firms that the district court found were
unlikely to engage in or be vulnerable to cartel activity in refusing to enjoin
an acquisition by ADM of one of its leading rivals in the high fructose corn
syrup market back in 1991.”228 In the ensuing private litigation, Judge
Posner writing for the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument
that the presence of large buyers that included Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola as
a matter of economic theory defeated the possibility of price-fixing:
although these “very large buyers” drove hard bargains and obtained large
discounts from the list price of HFCS, “it does not follow that the
defendants could not and did not fix the price of HFCS 55.”229
Indeed, going down the DOJ’s list of Sherman Act violations yielding a
corporate fine of $10 million or more,230 one finds other recent international
226

Id.
Id.
228
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Dep’t
of Justice, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: from Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful
Minds
and
Mavericks
19
(April
24,
2002),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/11050.htm.
229
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
230
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Sherman Act Violations Yielding a
227
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price-fixing cartels with big buyers as victims. The lysine cartel – featured
in the film The Informant! (based on a book of the same name)231 – is one
example. There the world’s major lysine manufacturers orchestrated an
international cartel that caused a 70 percent price increase in its first nine
months. The cartel victims included Tysons Foods (the largest purchaser of
lysine in the United States) and ConAgra (whose consumer brands are
found in 97 percent of U.S. households232). The liquid crystal display
panels cartel233 harmed “some of the largest computer, television and
cellular telephone manufacturers in the world, including Apple, Dell and
Motorola.”234 The air transportation cartel (among the “largest and most
far-reaching antitrust conspiracies ever detected by the Division”)235
affected “thousands of businesses–from the corner store to the biggest
corporation.”236

The Dynamic Random Access Memory cartel harmed

some of the world’s largest manufacturers of personal computers and
servers, including Dell Inc., Compaq Computer Corporation, HewlettPackard Company, Apple Computer, Inc., International Business Machines

Corporate
Fine
of
$10
Million
or
More
(as
of
2/16/2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/sherman10.html.
231
KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (2000).
232
Company
Profile,
http://investor.conagrafoods.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=202310&p=aboutus.
233
Criminal Information, United States v. LG Display Co., Ltd. & LG Display
America, Inc., Criminal No. CR 08-0803 VRW (N.D. Ca. Nov. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f239300/239375.htm .
234
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, LG, Sharp, Chunghwa Agree to Plead Guilty,
Pay Total Of $585 Million in Fines for Participating in LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracies
(Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/239349.pdf.
235
Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Div., “Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust Division’s
Criminal
Enforcement
Program”
(March
26,
2008),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.htm.
236
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Major International Airlines Agree to Plead
Guilty and Pay Criminal Fines Totaling More Than $500 Million for Fixing Prices on Air
Cargo
Rates
(June
26,
2008),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/234435.htm.
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The graphite electrodes conspiracy

affected sales to steel mills in the United States and abroad.238
So how should a generalist court respond to the defense that large
sophisticated buyers could readily defeat the exercise of market power?
Skeptically. First, in the context of merger challenges, customer testimony
is not always credible. Indeed, in contrast to the findings in ADM,239 some
courts have that found customer testimony as not probative of the merger’s
likely competitive effects, considering it lacking in foundation240 or
biased.241
Second, the behavioral economics literature suggests that big buyers
(like CEOs with respect to efficiencies and entry) may be overconfident of
their negotiating prowess to defeat any non-cost-based price hike. As a
result, when the antitrust agencies interview big buyers, those buyers may
not accurately project their skill and power over sellers with market or
monopoly power.

Additionally, these buyers’ responses might be

contingent on how the issue is framed. For example, big buyers may be
genuinely less concerned about protecting their customers (and thereby
resist any non-cost-based wholesale price increase by the merging parties)
237

Criminal Information, United States v. Samsung Electronics Company, Limited and
Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., CR-05-643 (PJH) (N.D. Ca. Oct. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f212000/212010.htm.
238
Government's Rule 11 Memorandum, United States v. SGL Carbon
Aktiengesellschaft and Robert J. Koehler, Criminal No. 99-244 (E.D. Pa. filed May 4,
1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f3800/3824.htm.
239
ADM, 781 F. Supp. at 1416, 1422.
240
United States v. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that
customer witness speculation about “what they could do in the event of an anticompetitive
price increase . . . was not backed up by serious analysis that they had themselves
performed or evidence they presented” and that there “was little, if any, testimony by these
witnesses about what they would or could do or not do to avoid a price increase”).
241
FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 145-146 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[W]hile the
court does not doubt the sincerity of the anxiety expressed by SPRB customers, the
substance of the concern articulated by the customers is little more than a truism of
economics: a decrease in the number of suppliers may lead to a decrease in the level of
competition in the market.”); see also FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 272 (8th Cir.
1995) (same).
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than taking sales away from their rivals (and thus willing to accept a supracompetitive wholesale price, if that price was lower relative to the
wholesale prices offered to their competitor retailers).
Once again, more empirical research is needed to determine under what
circumstances large, sophisticated purchasers have been successful or
unsuccessful in preventing the exercise of market power. In the short run,
however, the revisions to the Merger Guidelines suggest that the agencies
are willing to look beyond the mere fact that a large buyer exists to
determine whether that large buyer is actually in a position to constrain
anticompetitive conduct.242
D. Reliance on Optimal Deterrence Theory to Deter Cartels
The DOJ’s criminal antitrust prosecutions are driven more by the facts
than economic theory. But neoclassical economic theory still influences
antitrust policies on optimal penalties. The generally accepted approach
under neoclassical optimal deterrence theory is that “rational” profitmaximizers will weigh the magnitude of a likely penalty and the probability
of being detected against the gain from a violation before engaging in
anticompetitive conduct.243 To achieve optimal deterrence, the total penalty
levied against a cartel (which includes civil damages and criminal penalties)
should equal the violation’s expected net harm to others (plus enforcement

242

Supra note 220.
International Competition Network Working Group on Cartels, Building Blocks for
Effective Anti-Cartel Regimes vol. 1, Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective
Institutions,
Effective
Penalties
53
(June
2005),
available
at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_4th_bonn_2005
/Effective_Anti-Cartel_Regimes_Building_Blocks.pdf; Scott D. Hammond, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., The Evolution of
Criminal Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.htm (“If the potential penalties that can
be imposed upon cartel participants are not perceived as outweighing the potential rewards
of participating in a cartel, then the fine imposed becomes merely part of the cost of doing
business.”).
243
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costs) divided by the probability of detection and proof of the violation.244
The DOJ, however, unlike some law-and-economics scholars,245 believes
that corporate (or individual) fines are inadequate to deter cartels and that
incarceration is needed.
Over the last 50 years, Congress has considerably increased the
maximum monetary criminal penalties and incarceration periods for
antitrust violations. When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, violations
were misdemeanors with a maximum fine of $5,000 and up to one year
incarceration.246

By 1954, however, the then head of DOJ’s Antitrust

Division observed that “over the years a precedent has been established:
almost never has anyone been committed to jail for a Sherman Act
offense.”247 Congress responded with stiffer criminal penalties in 1955,248
1971,249 1984,250 1990,251 and, most recently, 2004.252
244

William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
652, 656, 666-68 (1983).
245
See, e.g., Joseph C. Gallo et al., Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement 19551997: An Empirical Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG. 75, 101 (2000) (summarizing economic
literature that nonmonetary sanctions are costly, should be used only with maximal
monetary sanctions and when offenders are poor); Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman,
Corruption and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, 24 INTERNAT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 219, 220 (2004); Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J.
POL. ECON. 385, 391 (1993).
246
Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§1-2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
247
Speech by Assistant Attorney Gen. Stanley N. Barnes, Promoting Competition:
Current Antitrust Problems and Policies, delivered before the Metropolitan Economic
Association, New York (Oct. 25, 1954).
248
Pub. L. No. 135, 69 Stat. 282, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958))
(increasing the maximum fine to $50,000). The average fine imposed under the Sherman
Act between 1946 and 1953 was reportedly $2600. Victor H. Kramer, Comment, Criminal
Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of A Policy, 48 GEO. L. J. 530,
532 n.9 (1960).
249
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, §3, 88 Stat.
1706, 1708 (1974) (increasing the maximum criminal fines to $1,000,000 for corporations
and $100,000 for individuals and making Sherman Act violations felonies with prison
terms of up to three years).
250
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3143,
reenacted in Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 100 Stat.
1279 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §3571(d) (2000)) (increasing the maximum
criminal fine for individuals convicted of an antitrust violation to $250,000 and authorizing
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Notwithstanding these repeated efforts to adjust the calculation for
potential cartel members, it is hard to tell how well these stiffer criminal
penalties are working.253 On the one hand, some cartels have carved out
the United States from their operations to avoid the risk of criminal
sanctions.254 But despite (i) the escalating criminal and civil fines in the
U.S. (and abroad), (ii) treble private civil damages, (iii) longer jail
sentences, and (iv) a generous leniency program, there is no indication that
the United States has reached optimal deterrence.255 Price-fixers continue
to make a skewed cost-benefits calculus (if they are, in fact, engaging in any
calculus) that leads them to believe that they are better off entering a cartel
than not.
The behavioral economics literature suggests that situational and
dispositional factors may account for such irrational behavior. Optimal
deterrence theory assumes that financial gains should motivate, and
financial penalties should deter, self-interested rational agents’ behavior.
But some executives refrain from price-fixing for ethical concerns, fear of
social disapproval from their peers, or other informal norms.256

Thus

the agencies to calculate the maximum fine for corporations or individuals as twice the loss
suffered by victims or twice the gain realized by the offender).
251
Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, §4, 104 Stat. 2879, 2880
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1-3 (2004)); see also S. Rep. No. 101-287, as
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4108 (May 14, 1990) (increasing the maximum criminal
fines to $10 million for corporations and $350,000 for individuals).
252
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108237, §215, 118 Stat. 665, 668 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1-3 (2006)) (increasing
the maximum fines for corporations to $100 million, the maximum fine for individuals to
$1 million, and the maximum incarceration period to ten years).
253
For an argument that the U.S. has not yet achieved optimal deterrence, see Stucke,
supra note 28.
254
OECD, Hard-Core Cartels: Third Report on the Implementation of the 1998
Recommendation
15
(2005),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
30/2/36600303.pdf.
255
Stucke, supra note 28; Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 443, 470-74 (2006).
256
Stucke, supra note 28; Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What
the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV.
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informal norms can have a powerful influence on behavior. One cannot
assume that by criminalizing conduct policymakers necessarily inculcate
these moral and social concerns.257

In developing the informal norms

against price-fixing by accentuating the conduct’s immoral and unethical
content, policymakers may be able to better deter cartels.258
Another factor is the optimism or overconfidence bias discussed above:
just as individuals overestimate their likelihood of achieving efficiencies or
gaining successful entry, price-fixers may also overvalue their likelihood of
escaping prosecution. Yet another factor is the availability heuristic, under
which the “perceived probability of detection depend[s] on not only how
frequently offenses are detected but also on how salient or vivid the method
of detection is.”259 If potential cartel participants have little exposure to
recent prosecutions, they are apt to undervalue the likelihood of being
caught. Some antitrust lawyers therefore find it highly effective to include
in antitrust compliance programs a former executive involved in a pricefixing scandal.260
Ultimately the economic model must account for social policies that can
influence the executives’ decision to engage in price-fixing, including the
perceived probability of detection.261 Thus, the optimal means to deter

1839, 1861-62 (2000); H.G. Grasmick & D.E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social
Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980).
257
C. Beaton-Wells & F. Haines, Making Cartel Conduct Criminal: A Case Study of
Ambiguity in Controlling Business Behavior, 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 218
(2009).
258
Stucke, supra note 255, at 505-23 (discussing how antitrust agencies can promote
moral norms to better deter antitrust crimes).
259
McAdams & Ulen, supra note 16.
260
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND
RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 34 (2005). Besides these dispositional factors,
a host of situational factors also may be at work. See Stucke, supra note 28, at 15-42
(discussing the situational factors and the extent to which they may influence cartel
formation).
261
ICN Working Group on Cartels, supra note 243, at 54 (recognizing that while the
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cartels will involve a pluralism of mechanisms, including criminal and civil
penalties, structural means (improved merger review), and developing
informal norms that highlight price-fixing’s ethical and moral implications.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS GOING FORWARD
The behavioral economics literature, as Part III discusses, can help the
antitrust agencies explore which of their assumptions premised on
neoclassical theory are sheltering anticompetitive conduct and increasing
the costs of false negatives. This Part proposes several actions that the
agencies can undertake to advance behavioral antitrust. As a first principle
behavioral economics can instill in antitrust policymakers the importance of
nuance and not being tethered to particular mainstream modes of thinking
when factual reality does not square with economic orthodoxy.
A. To be Applied Well, Behavioral Antitrust Requires More Empirical
Work
Some skeptics will continue to question whether irrational conduct has
any implications for antitrust analysis. But whatever its label, behavioral
economics at its core is empirical. The literature first identifies normative
assumptions

underlying the prevalent

economic theories;

second,

empirically tests these assumptions and considers alternative explanations;
and third, uses the anomalies to create new theories that are further
empirically tested.
We believe that behavioral economics identifies enough holes in the
simplistic rationality assumption to fortify the argument for more empirical
work in antitrust policy. One need not be a behavioral economist to agree.
Commissioner Kovacic, among others, has long called for more
calculation method of optimal deterrence theory “is widely considered to be correct, there
are some doubts as to its practicability (difficulties of calculation and proof) and some
concerns about the companies’ rights being impaired if other criteria are completely
disregarded in setting the fines”).
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empirically-driven research policies, noting how investments in knowledge
“have long-term capital qualities”, and help ensure that the agency stays
abreast of important developments in economic theory, empirical study, and
legal analysis,” is a crucial element of effective case selection, “increases
the agency's ability to attempt more complex and demanding matters, helps
the agency ground its cases in the best possible conceptual and empirical
foundations, and provides assurance that the agency will not find itself
trapped in the wrong analytical model.”262
Competition policy’s greatest failing has been its incomplete
understanding of how competition works in particular markets in particular
communities at particular time periods and the interplay among private
institutions, government institutions, and informal social, ethical, and moral
norms. By undertaking more empirical research, competition authorities
will understand better the competitive dynamics of particular markets and
how legal and informal norms interact to influence individual behavior and
competition generally.
Competition authorities can use many inter-disciplinary avenues to
improve their understanding of market dynamics across different industries.
This Article addresses two avenues:
review.

post-merger and post-conviction

263

1. Post-Merger Review
To illustrate the benefits of post-merger review, we will use a merger
between two nearby non-profit hospitals in California’s Oakland-Alameda
County region.264 The state of California sought to enjoin this hospital
262

William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good
Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 922 (2009).
263
See Stucke, supra note 114 (discussing in greater detail the need for such
empirically-driven research, its benefits, and several possible concerns of these proposals);
Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, GCP (Global Competition Policy) MAG., Jan.
2009 (same).
264
California v. Sutter Health System, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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merger under the federal antitrust laws. Geographic market definition was
crucial.265

The district court was confronted with the issue of where

patients could practicably turn for acute hospital inpatients services. If one
defined the geographic market broadly, then one would assume that the
merged hospitals would face stiff competition from over twenty hospitals in
the San Francisco and East Bay areas. With conflicting economic expert
testimony, the district court not surprisingly followed the approach by other
courts that relied on the Elzinga-Hogarty economic analysis for defining the
relevant geographic market. As the district court stated:
the first prong of the Elzinga-Hogarty test requires a determination of
the merging hospitals’ ‘service area,’ that area from which they attract
their patients. In the second step, two measurements are taken of the
flow of patients into and out of the test market. The Little In From
Outside (“LIFO”) measurement calculates the percentage of patients
who reside inside the test market that are admitted to those hospitals
located within the test market. A LIFO of 100% would indicate that all
hospital admittees who are residents of the test market are admitted to
hospitals located within the test market. The Little Out From Inside
(“LOFI”) measurement calculates the percentage of the test market's
hospitals' patients who reside in the test market. A LOFI of 100% would
indicate that all hospital patients admitted to hospitals in the test market
are residents of the test market. A LIFO and LOFI of 75% is considered
a weak indication of the existence of a market and a LIFO and LOFI of
90% is considered a strong indication of a market.266
The plaintiff alleged an Inner East Bay geographic market. Plaintiff’s
economic expert showed that 85 percent of all patients admitted to hospitals
in the proposed Inner East Bay market resided in the Inner East Bay; the
remaining 15 percent of patients resided outside the Inner East Bay.
Similarly, 85 percent of patients who resided in the Inner East Bay were
265

The parties agreed that the relevant product market was the cluster of services
comprising acute inpatient care, including the services provided by Kaiser hospitals. Sutter
Health System, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
266
Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-21 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
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admitted to hospitals inside this area, with the remaining 15 percent sought
hospital treatment outside this area. The state of California argued that the
85% LIFO and LOFI results, along with its other evidence, were sufficient
to prove geographic market. The district court disagreed. The state’s 85%
results failed to meet “the preferred 90% threshold” of LIFO and LOFI
calculations that represent “a strong showing that a market exists.”267
The district court also believed that big buyers (namely the health plans)
when faced with a price increase had numerous mechanisms to discipline
the hospitals. The merging parties’ hospitals were approximately 2½ miles
apart. The State of California argued that many patients, because of traffic
and loyalty considerations to their doctors, would be unwilling to travel east
through the Caldecott Tunnel and west across the Bay Bridge to these other
hospitals.

The court disagreed.

The health plan providers could keep

hospital prices low by “steering” patients to lower cost health care
providers. Hospitals had high fixed costs in terms of the physical plant,
equipment and maintaining a highly skilled staff, and consequently would
be sensitive to such declines in patient volume. So if the hospitals postmerger tried to increase prices for acute inpatient care, then the rational
profit-maximizing health plans would steer enough members away from the
hospitals to defeat the exercise of market power. Indeed, the president and
CEO of the second largest health plan in the East Bay downplayed the
possibility of a price increase by the hospitals post-merger, in part due to
the health plans’ ability to steer patients to lower cost facilities.
The district court also expressed greater concern over the costs of false
positives (than false negatives), fearing that its “‘judicial intervention in a
competitive situation can itself upset the balance of market force, bringing
about the very ills the antitrust laws were meant to prevent.’ This appears to
267

Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
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have even more force in an industry, such as healthcare, experiencing
significant and profound changes.”268 (The court also held that defendants
successfully established a failing company defense.)

Accordingly, the

district court permitted the merger to go through.
So what happened post-merger? Did the merged hospital try to raise
prices at one or both hospitals? If so, did the powerful health plans, as the
defendants argued and as the health plan CEO and district court predicted,
steer customers to the other Bay Area hospitals and defeat the exercise of
market power? Often, the antitrust agencies don’t know the answer to these
questions.

The competition agencies devote considerable resources

investigating ex ante the merger. The agencies’ lawyers and economists
work very hard to predict the merger’s likely competitive effects. But they
often examine only half of the picture, namely the state of competition
several years before the merger. Indeed, the antitrust agencies could simply
abandon hospital mergers where the LIFO and LOFI figures fall below 90
percent or big buyers could steer patients to other hospitals.
After the FTC, DOJ, and California’s Attorney General lost six straight
hospital merger challenges in the 1990s, the FTC announced its Hospital
Merger Retrospectives Project.269

To better understand hospital

competition and the effects of hospital mergers and update its prior
assumptions about the consequences of particular transactions and the
nature of competitive forces in health care, the FTC reviewed several
consummated hospital mergers, including a retrospective study of the
merger between the Bay Area hospitals.270 The FTC used detailed claims

268

Id. at 1137, quoting FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir.

1999).
269

Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Two Hospital Mergers on Chicago’s
North Shore: A Retrospective Study, Working Paper No. 294 (Jan. 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp294.pdf.
270
Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-

9-Aug-10]

Behavioral Antitrust

67

data from three large health insurers to compare the post-merger price
change for the merging hospitals to a set of control group hospitals.
So what happened post-merger? Not only did prices increase post
merger, but the price increase was among the largest of any comparable
hospital in California. The merged entity significantly raised prices for one
of the merging hospitals between 23.2% and 50.4% relative to the control
group.271
But the FTC’s findings raise larger unanswered questions: faced with
this steep price increase, did the health plan providers try to steer patients to
other hospitals? Did patients resist? As for the CEO who confidently
predicted his company’s ability to defeat any price increase, what went
wrong?
Rather than continue to rely on empirically-unsupported assumptions,
now is the time for the antitrust agencies to review systematically what
actually happens post-merger.

The agencies should institute specific

mechanisms to test empirically the following key assumptions underlying
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: (i) anticompetitive effects are likely to
occur only in highly concentrated (not moderately concentrated to
unconcentrated) markets; (ii) even in highly concentrated markets,
anticompetitive unilateral or coordinated effects are unlikely, absent certain
economic conditions; (iii) anticompetitive effects are unlikely, absent high
Summit Transaction, FTC Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 293 (Nov. 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp293.pdf; see also Haas-Wilson & Garmon, supra
note ; Aileen Thompson, The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices: A Case Study
of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction, FTC Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 295
((Jan. 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp295.pdf.
271
The price increase at the other hospital was not statistically different from the
control group for any of the insurers. Tenn, supra note 270, at 20. One explanation Tenn
provided for this asymmetry was that as a major provider of hospital services to
commercial patients in the Oakland-Berkeley area, Alta Bates was a significant price
constraint on Summit. However, Summit may have been less of a constraint on Alta Bates’
price since Summit was a relatively minor provider of hospital services to commercial
patients. Id. at 22.
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entry barriers; and (iv) many companies merge to generate significant
efficiencies.
First, the federal antitrust agencies should conduct a post-merger
analysis of any merger subject to an extended Second Request review in
which the agency: (i) took no enforcement action; (ii) permitted the merger
in part to be consummated pursuant to a consent decree; or (iii) challenged
the merger in court, but lost. The antitrust agency two to five years after the
merger was consummated should examine the state of competition in that
industry, including pricing levels and non-price components such as
innovation, productivity, services, and quality, to the extent observable, and
test some of their predictions when the originally reviewed the merger.
When ending a merger investigation, the agencies typically provide
reasons in a closing memorandum why the merger was unlikely to
substantially lessen competition. The closing memorandum consequently
offers testable predictions (such as whether an entrant or big buyer would
defeat the exercise of market power or consumers would shift to another
product or geographic area).
To mitigate the burden on the agencies and market participants, the
agencies can develop a two-stage post-merger review. In the first stage, the
agency staff would conduct a quick-look review of competition in that
industry. The staff would interview a small but representative sample of
industry participants (for example in a merger involving household
consumer products, the staff would interview buyers from food, drug, and
mass merchandiser retailers) about the status of competition and request
from the merged entity a limited quantity of data, including relevant price
data.

If the quick-look review suggests that competition significantly

diminished, the agencies would engage in a more in-depth review and
analyze whether they had predicted correctly.
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The agency would report whether other variables, besides the merger,
might explain the increase in prices or reduction in innovation, productivity,
services, and quality. For those companies identified as potential entrants in
the original merger review, the reviewing agency would analyze, based on
its interviews with these identified entrants, why they chose not to enter, or
if they did enter, why they were ineffectual. The reviewing agency would
describe which, if any, of the merging parties’ efficiencies it could verify
post-merger, the magnitude of the efficiencies, and the extent consumers
directly benefited from such efficiencies.
The federal antitrust agencies would also summarize their findings for
the public, and describe annually what specific actions, if any, they are
undertaking with respect to this data, including how they are incorporating
the findings from this data in their merger review.
Second, the Obama administration should request, and Congress should
provide, the DOJ with subpoena authority for non-public information to
conduct such post-merger review for its industries. The DOJ’s Antitrust
Division appears to be more limited in conducting such general post-merger
review.

Its subpoena authority in civil investigations comes from the

Antitrust Civil Process Act,272 which limits an antitrust investigation to
premerger activities or suspected antitrust violations.273

The FTC, in

contrast, has broader statutory authority to gather information on the effects
of its enforcement measures.274

This subpoena authority should be

sufficiently broad to enable the DOJ to test (and eliminate) other
explanations as to why competition (which includes important parameters
beyond price) increased or diminished post-merger. The federal antitrust
agencies should also coordinate with other federal agencies in sharing such
272

15 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1314.
15 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
274
See 15 U.S.C. § 46.
273
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information, subject to the data producer’s ability to challenge the
dissemination of its commercially sensitive information.
Third, any publicly held company that seeks to rely on an efficiency
defense before the antitrust agencies and/or the courts should be required to
publicly report its claimed efficiencies in its filings with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission.

(If such disclosure would divulge a trade

secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information that would be ordinarily protected from public disclosure under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), then the antitrust agencies may excuse the public
disclosure of such information.) For each year post-merger (for the period
that it claims the efficiencies will be realized), the company should report
the actual amount of efficiencies realized versus the projected amount. This
should temper the company executives from inflating the claimed
efficiencies, and hold them accountable to the shareholders for pursuing a
growth-by-acquisition strategy, while informing the agencies on those
efficiencies for particular industries that are more likely to be cognizable
and substantial.
The FTC’s recent hospital merger retrospectives have been very helpful.
But there does not exist today a built-in mechanism for routine post-merger
review across agencies. Empirically testing and refining the neoclassical
economic theories underlying much of Merger Guidelines have several
benefits.

Such empirical work promotes effective learning by creating

feedback about the relation between the situational conditions and the
appropriate response. By instituting a regular and systematic review of
close-call mergers, the agencies reduce the likelihood of false negatives and
positives in merger review, promote more effective antitrust enforcement,
increase transparency of the merger review process, and make themselves
more accountable for their decisions. An empirically-driven competition
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policy may also temper the claims, which have also increased over the past
quarter century, of partisanship in antitrust enforcement.
2. Post-Conviction Review
To better understand why executives engage in price-fixing and to
advance the empirical research on coordinated effects, the agencies should
report two to five years after prosecuting a cartel, the state of competition in
that industry, as described above. With criminal cartel prosecutions, the
DOJ typically seeks fines and incarceration; whether these measures were
sufficient to restore competition and deter recidivism should be assessed.
After securing its criminal convictions, the DOJ by itself or through a
pilot program with social scientists should interview the price-fixers and
publicly report the following: How were the cartels (including those with
many members) formed and enforced?

Did they act as many profit-

maximizer game theories predict, or were they more trusting and
cooperative than these theories’ predicted outcome?275 If so, why? As the
number of conspirators increased, were there other specific factors that
enabled them to collude? Why did certain companies repeatedly violate the
antitrust laws? What steps did the company take after its earlier conviction
to increase antitrust compliance, and why were they unsuccessful?
The DOJ also should make available a computerized database
identifying all civil and criminal antitrust consent decrees, pleas, or litigated
actions involving cartel activity under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
database should include certain industry characteristics, such as: (i) the
number of conspirators (and best estimate of their market shares); (ii) the
length of conspiracy; (iii) the product or services market in which collusion
occurred; (iv) the number of competitors (and their market share) who were
not formerly alleged to be part of the conspiracy; (v) the number of entrants

275

Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004).
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(and their market shares) during the period of the conspiracy; and (vi) the
nature of the conspiracy.276 This data can help those in academia, private
practice and the antitrust agencies to better understand collusion, and further
develop screening mechanisms to identify industries more susceptible to
collusion.277
One cannot assume that such empirical testing and learning will arise
independently within competition policy. The Supreme Court and lower
courts cannot undertake such empirical testing as their view is limited to the
evidence the parties supply. Nor can academia and the private bar fulfill
this mission. Compiling such data can be often costly and non-public. In
undertaking this empirical testing and learning, the competition authorities
can enrich the marketplace of ideas. The data lowers the search costs for
academics and increases transparency.
B. Possibilities for Incorporating Behavioral Economics into Existing
Antitrust Doctrine
Besides the empirical evidence needed to improve the predictive
capabilities of antitrust’s economic theories, is there a role for behavioral
economics to play in antitrust analysis? Even with further empirical work,
behavioral economics may not ultimately supply a single organizing
principle.

It is unlikely that behavioral economics will yield a single

concentration measure (like the HHI) to predict which mergers may
substantially lessen competition. Nor will behavioral economics offer a rule
276

Keeping the data consistent can be difficult. Market definition at times is
problematic. Identifying conspirators may depend on the sufficiency of evidence and
burden of proof, which differs in the civil and criminal context. Other firms could have
been involved in the conspiracy, but the evidence was insufficient to prosecute. The
criteria should be whether a criminal or civil complaint was brought against the firm (and
whether the matter was criminal or civil). Granted, the data at times may underreport the
number of firms involved in the cartel, but having data with such caveats is better than no
data.
277
R Abrantes-Metz & P Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple
Applications, 24 ANTITRUST 66 (Fall 2009) (describing screening mechanisms to detect
cartels).
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at a broad level of generality that dictates when unilateral conduct crosses
the debated lines from beneficial to benign to anticompetitive.
But this is no reason to ignore the behavioral economics literature. Life
is messier than the Chicago School’s unifying vision of self-correcting
markets filled with rational profit-maximizing agents that pursue their
economic self-interest. Relying on market fundamentalism only will lead to
future market crises and government bailouts. Along the way to the next
financial crisis, there will be cases where the Chicago School’s rigid
assumptions (which, in turn, supply the models’ predictive capabilities) fail
to explain or predict the market behavior. Behavioral economics can better
explain behavior that the Chicago School ignores or marginalizes.
So even without additional empirical work, behavioral economics may
play a role in the agencies’ analysis in (i) instructing the courts and agencies
to reevaluate hard cases where, on the one hand, neoclassical analysis
suggests that the conduct is not or should not be anticompetitive but
sufficient evidence suggest the contrary; (ii) informing the competition
agencies whether they are indeed fulfilling their mission; and (iii) providing
insights into possible applications of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
1. Use of “Real World” Evidence That Is Not Explainable by Neoclassical
Economic Theory
At times neoclassical economic theory cannot be easily reconciled with
evidence of the parties’ behavior, intent, motives, or post-merger plans.278
In some instances, economic theory suggests an oligopoly’s ability to tacitly
collude (for example to successfully implement a predatory pricing scheme)
is impossible despite the evidence of anticompetitive intent and the fact that

278

See Leslie, supra note 33, at 318-38 (discussing evidence of antitrust violations,
which were implausible under neoclassical economic theory, for predatory pricing, pricefixing, group boycotts of suppliers, and conspiracies to conceal an invalid patent).
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the companies for 40 to 50 years were able to raise prices twice annually
like clockwork.279
In other instances, the Chicago School economic theories suggest that,
absent inter-brand market power, a manufacturer cannot raise the price for
its aftermarket parts or services.

Rational consumers considering the

purchase of the equipment “will inevitably factor into [their] purchasing
decision the expected cost of aftermarket support.”280 As the Court’s Kodak
decision reflects, economic theory may be inconsistent with the economic
reality, with evidence of increased prices and excluded competition.281 The
Chicago School’s beliefs, some skeptics may say, were raised in Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Kodak. But it is questionable whether the current Court
would reach the same outcome in Kodak, especially if they, as Professor
Hovenkamp and Justice Scalia, “believe that markets generally work well
when left alone, [and] intervention is justified only in the relatively few
cases where the judiciary can fix the problem more reliably, more cheaply,
or more quickly than the market can fix itself.”282
Chairman

Leibowitz’s

and

Commissioner

Rosch’s

concurring

statements in the Ovation case provide another illustration of the extent to
279

Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 257 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 495 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
281
In Kodak, there was no actual evidence that higher service prices did (or would
likely) lead to a disastrous drop in equipment sales. Kodak’s service prices increased. But
there was no evidence of Kodak’s equipment sales decreasing as a result. Contrary to
Kodak’s theoretical claim, there was no evidence that Kodak actually priced its equipment
at below-market prices and its services at supra-competitive prices for an overall
competitive price. Also contrary to defendant’s theoretical claim, the information costs
were significant. Customers had to inform themselves of the total cost at the time of
purchase. Such accurate lifecycle pricing of complex, durable equipment is difficult,
costly, and customer-specific. Contrary to defendant’s theoretical claim, Kodak’s
competitors would not necessarily provide this lifecycle information. Such information
was costly for competitors to obtain, and even if Kodak’s competitors had the lifecycle
information, it may have been more profitable for the competitors to follow Kodak’s lead
and reap supra-competitive prices in their own service and parts market. Id. at 474 n.21.
282
Herbert Hovenkamp, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 124
(Harvard 2005).
280
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which documents reflecting the parties’ intentions and incentives can affect
merger analysis.283
Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc. acquired two drugs to treat patent ductus
arteriosus (“PDA”), a serious congenital heart defect in newborns. First,
Ovation acquired from Merck the drug Indocin.

Several months later,

Ovation acquired from Abbott Laboratories the U.S. rights to the drug
NeoProfen.284

After acquiring NeoProfen, Ovation raised the price it

charged hospitals for Indocin by nearly 1,300 percent. In December 2008,
the FTC challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act Ovation’s
acquisition of NeoProfen as a merger to monopoly in a market for drugs
used to treat PDA. Although Commissioner Rosch voted in favor of the
Section 7 challenge, he argued in his concurrence that Ovation’s earlier
acquisition of Indocin was also subject to challenge under Section 7.
Here again the actual evidence is hard to reconcile with the Chicago
School’s neoclassical economic theories. Specifically Indocin for many
years was the only FDA-approved pharmaceutical treatment for PDA.
Given Indocin’s market position, Merck (its original owner) could have
charged a monopoly price for its drug. Indeed under the Court’s dicta in
Trinko, Merck’s charging a monopoly price would serve “an important
element of the free-market system,” in that monopoly pricing serves as an
inducement to “attract[] ‘business acumen’ in the first place” and engage in
“risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”285
283

Concurring Statement of Comm’r J. Thomas Rosch, FTC v. Ovation Pharms., Inc.
(Dec.
16,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810156/081216ovationroschstmt.pdf (hereinafter “Rosch
Concurrence”); Concurring Statement of Comm’r Jon Leibowitz, FTC v. Ovation Pharms.,
Inc.
(Dec.
16,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810156/081216ovationleibowitzstmt.pdf
(“Leibowitz
Concurrence”).
284
FTC v. Ovation Pharms., 0:2008cv06379 (D. Minn. filed Dec. 16, 2008), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810156/081216ovationcmpt.pdf.
285
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
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So one is left with two monopolists, each presumably a rational profitmaximizer, choosing dramatically different pricing policies for a patented
drug. Why didn’t Merck, a large sophisticated company, sell Indocin at the
monopoly price (under $30 per vial at the time of the acquisition)? Perhaps
reputational effects, said Commissioner Rosch. If Merck sold a product
used to treat premature babies at a monopoly price, “that could damage its
reputation and its sales of those more profitable products.”286 It could also
be that ethics and conscience had an impact on Merck’s pricing decision.
But in a world of rational profit-maximizers, consumers would applaud, not
condemn, Merck.

Charging parents whose babies were born with this

potentially life-threatening congenital heart defect the monopoly price
would signal others to invest in such innovative drugs. Instead, reality
suggests that consumers and the Chicago School economist differ at times
in their perception of what is fair.287
But that dynamic changed when Ovation acquired Indocin from Merck.
Commissioner Rosch found “reason to believe that the sale of Indocin to
Ovation had the effect of eliminating the reputational constraints on Merck
that existed prior to the sale.”288 Specifically, Ovation lacked Merck’s
“large product portfolio,” so Ovation “arguably was not concerned, as
Merck had been, that the sale of Indocin at a monopoly price would damage
its reputation and sales of more profitable products.”289 Thus, because
Merck did not charge a monopoly price for its drug used to treat premature
babies, Merck “arguably would not have the incentive to acquire another
treatment that might prevent it from pricing Indocin at a monopoly

286

Rosch Concurrence, supra note 231, at 1.
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at
252, 264.
288
Rosch Concurrence, supra note 283, at 1.
289
Id.
287
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Because there was evidence that the transaction substituted

“Ovation, a firm that had an incentive to protect its ability to engage in
monopoly pricing, for Merck, which lacked the same incentive” and that
“Merck had no incentive to acquire NeoProfen, but Ovation had an
incentive to do so in order to maintain its monopoly pricing in the PDA
market,” Commissioner Rosch, joined by Chairman Leibowitz, stated that
he would have challenged Ovation’s first acquisition as well.291
More generally, it may be the case that behavioral economics finds its
best fit in merger review, which is perhaps the closest antitrust enforcers
come to in engaging in a traditional regulatory process.292

The expert

agencies rely on a routine (including the presumptions discussed in Part III)
to winnow their review of thousands of merger filings to a small percentage.
For these mergers, the agencies engage in highly fact-specific inquiries;
their conclusions in the form of closing statements and/or a consent decree
are case specific and do not constitute binding precedent; and the review of
the proposed merger is done ex ante rather than ex post.
The merger review process offers the agencies with the benefit of an
extensive factual record, including investigational submissions of the
290

Id.
Id.; Leibowitz Concurrence, supra note 283, at 1 (noting that Merck kept prices low
“perhaps because it was worried that a significant price increase would have harmed its
reputation” and that “[f]or that reason, I would have supported the approach proposed by
Commissioner Rosch”); see also Interview with J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal
Trade Comm’n, 23 Antitrust ABA 32, 40 (Spring 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090126abainterview.PDF (noting that the Ovation
statement involved “the notion that economic theory should increasingly focus on
incentives rather than on market structure”).
292
AMC Report, supra note 162, at 51 (noting how merger enforcement “has shifted in
emphasis from a litigation-based system focused on judicial review of consummated deals
to an administrative regime in which [FTC and DOJ] review mergers above a certain size
prior to consummation.”); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The
Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1400 (1998) (discussing
antitrust’s shift from a prosecutorial to regulatory model and with regard to HSR merger
review how “regulation and administrative law-making have replaced the courts as the
source for the creation and enforcement of antitrust law”).
291
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parties, interviews with customers and competitors, and the parties’
documents. At times neoclassical theory cannot explain the evidence of the
merging parties’ behavior, intent, motives, or post-merger plans. In this
vein, the recent changes to the Merger Guidelines open the door for greater
consideration of “direct evidence” of the type that Chairman Leibowitz and
Commissioner Rosch credited in Ovation. The revised Merger Guidelines,
for example, explain that merger review is a “fact-specific process through
which the Agencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools to the reasonably
available and reliable evidence to evaluate competitive concerns” and will
evaluate “several categories and sources of evidence,” including the parties’
documents and testimony.293 And unlike the prior Guidelines, the revised
Merger Guidelines enumerate several categories of such direct evidence.
The fact that the Guidelines now explicitly recognize that such evidence
is entitled to weight on par with economic modeling may provide both the
agencies as well as the parties with a structure for evaluating evidence in
light of the insights that behavioral economics offers. As Commissioner
Rosch has observed, this, in turn, could allow the agencies to more carefully
scrutinize the close cases that neoclassical thinking predicts should be procompetitive or competitively neutral, but where actual evidence of how the
firms do and will behave show otherwise.294 Behavioral economics thus
can fill in the analysis and explain the real-world evidence when
neoclassical economic theory cannot.
2. A Better Informed Competition Advocate
The federal antitrust agencies are well suited to consider how the
behavioral economics literature can inform antitrust analysis.
First, at a macro institutional level, the agencies can draw on the
behavioral insights they have gained outside of federal civil antitrust law to
293
294

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 32, at §§ 1.0, 2.1.1, 2.2.
Rosch, Managing Irrationality, supra note 26, at 9.
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better inform their competition missions. To this end, the DOJ can use its
expertise in prosecuting white-collar crimes generally (and price-fixing
conspiracies in particular) to inquire why executives, with so much to lose,
fix prices, and why cartels are more durable and its members more trustful
than neoclassical economic theory predicts.
Similarly, the FTC can marry insights gained from its Bureau of
Consumer Protection about the types of conduct that are likely to deceive
consumers with insights from its Bureau of Economics about when such
deception harms competition (as opposed to individual harm that does not
significantly impair competition). The alleged competitive harm in several
recent Commission cases – N-Data,295 Rambus,296 and Intel297 – was
premised, in part, on deception. More generally, the FTC can explore ways
that it can bring its consumer protection mission in line with a goal of
creating and preserving consumer choice (as opposed to narrowly focusing
on seller behavior through mandated disclosures or anti-fraud laws).298 A
goal of protecting consumer choice requires enacting policies that, from the
consumer’s perspective, remove barriers to optimal decision-making;
removing those barriers, in turn, depends on analyzing how consumers
make decisions in the first place. Moreover, a focus on consumer choice is
broad enough to encompass the insights from the FTC’s ongoing studies
into behavioral economics, but not so broad as to necessarily displace the
neoclassical emphasis on providing consumers with full-decision-making
authority.
295

In re Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC, Dkt. No. 051-0094 (2007) (Complaint),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080923ndscomplaint.pdf.
296
In
re
Rambus,
FTC
Dkt.
No.
9302
(2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf, rev’d Rambus Inc. v.
FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
297
In re Intel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) (Complaint),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf.
298
See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice”
Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007).
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Second, the FTC and DOJ have developed substantive areas of expertise
in certain complex and important industries, including defense, media,
healthcare, petroleum, and pharmaceuticals. At times, the agencies will
observe behavior in these industries that often lead to anticompetitive
effects--even though rational choice theory may predict otherwise. The
agencies can challenge these practices as presumptively illegal under a
truncated rule-of-reason/“inherently suspect” analysis.299

The FTC, in

particular, has recently signaled an interest in applying the “inherently
suspect” test to specific practices.300 This framework would reduce the cost
of error under the Court’s per se rule, without imposing the high litigation
costs and risk of false positives and negatives under the rule of reason.301
Third, from a procedural standpoint, the DOJ and FTC also have the
benefit of an extensive investigational process that allows them to evaluate
on the basis of the parties’ documents, investigational hearings, and
economic analysis, whether and to what extent harm to competition is
occurring.

In post-merger reviews, for example, the agencies can

investigate whether rational profit-maximizers did indeed enter the markets
(and if not why not). Private antitrust plaintiffs typically do not possess
299

See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005); N. Tex. Spec. Physicians v. FTC, 528
F.3d 346, 370 (5th Cir. 2008).
300
See, e.g., In re Realcomp II Ltd., No. 9320, 2009 FTC LEXIS 250, at *39 (F.T.C.
Oct. 30, 2009) (finding certain practices of multistate listing service were “inherently
suspect” and that the plaintiff did not come forward with evidence to carry its burden and
explain why those practices should be legal); see generally Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors,
Real Estate Brokers and Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis,
in Antitrust, Spring 2010, at 40 (providing overview of “inherently suspect” analysis).
301
As Professors Tor and Rinner’s recent work on behavioral antitrust shows,
executives may engage in resale price maintenance when irrational. Tor & Rinner, supra
note 28. Before Leegin and Sylvania, manufacturers were unlikely to swim the narrow
channel of Colgate unless they had a compelling pro-competitive justification for their
action. Thus, one benefit of moving RPM’s legal standard from rule-of-reason to a quicklook standard is that the presumption of illegality would require executives to evaluate
more closely (and justify to their counsel) why they want to institute RPM and be able to
substantiate why the pro-competitive benefits actually outweigh the anticompetitive effects.
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such extensive information, which at times is non-public and costly to
collect. Moreover, when it so chooses, the FTC can pursue administrative
litigation and issue a ruling in the first instance that not only has the force of
law (subject to federal appellate review), but provides a roadmap for federal
appellate courts to consider in their review.
Fourth, from a policy standpoint, the DOJ and FTC can regularly assess
whether the agency remedies are indeed effective – a process that the FTC
has engaged on both the antitrust302 and consumer protection side.303 Other
agencies at times seek to promulgate rules to protect the consumer that are
anti-competitive.

At times firms compete to exploit or help bounded

rational consumers. Distinguishing between the two can be challenging. So
the federal antitrust agencies, by understanding behavioral economics, can
better understand when firms are providing consumers commitment devices
to deal with their bounded willpower (e.g., Christmas savings club
accounts) or competing in better ways to simply exploit them.

Antitrust

authorities can offer a more nuanced and powerful message that accounts
for consumers’ interest and protects competition than overly simplistic
assumptions that “big is bad” or that humans behave as rational selfinterested consumers with perfect willpower.

302

See Federal Trade Comm’n, A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process
(1999), http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf.
303
A good example of such work occurred when the FTC’s Bureau of Economics Staff
released a study showing that the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)’s proposed broker compensation disclosures confused consumers, leading many of
them to choose loans that were more expensive. See Federal Trade Comm’n, Bureau of
Economics Staff Report, The Effect of Mortgage Broker Compensation Disclosures on
Consumers
and
Competition:
A
Controlled
Experiment
(Feb.
2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/030123mortgagesummary.pdf. The FTC recommended
that HUD should modify the mandated disclosures and encourage customers to engage in
educated comparison shopping on loan costs. In so doing, the FTC melded behavioral
economics and neoclassical economics by using insights it had gained from studies of
consumer behavior to suggest ways HUD could more effectively arm consumers with
information that they were likely to credit in ways that were consistent with their selfinterest.
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3. Providing Insights into Possible Applications of Section 5 of the FTC
Act
Behavioral economics can inform the FTC’s application of its Section 5
authority, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.”304 Although the FTC routinely uses its Section
5 authority in the consumer protection context, it has also applied its standalone Section 5 authority in the antitrust context305 (although the scope of
the FTC’s Section 5 authority in that context remains a subject of much
debate).
In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the Supreme Court stated that
Section 5 empowers the FTC to “define and proscribe an unfair competitive
practice, even though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the
spirit of the antitrust laws” and to “proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive
in their effect on competition,”306 Besides this broad statement, the Court
has provided little guidance on Section 5’s scope or application. Congress
amended the FTC Act in 1994 to incorporate the consumer injury test,
which the FTC had earlier adopted.307 Although the codification provided
guidance on what is unfair, the Commission, academics, and practitioners
are still sorting through what types of conduct Section 5 might cover.308
In the context of those debates, three of the current Federal Trade
Commissioners have observed that, because the Supreme Court has
contracted the reach of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, using Section
304

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
See, e.g., In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, Administrative Complaint, FTC
File No. 051-0094 (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/index.shtm
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Communications, Inc., FTC File No. 051 008 (Complaint) (alleging pure Section 5
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' 9:7, at 50-51 (West 2009).
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5 of the FTC Act might be justified in those cases where anticompetitive
conduct is occurring, but where the current antitrust doctrine does not
supply a cause of action.309 The FTC is uniquely positioned to draw on the
behavioral economics literature in these circumstances.

As Susan

Creighton, former FTC Commissioner Tom Leary, and others have
suggested, “[p]erhaps the least controversial application of a stand-alone
Section 5 claim should be its use in ‘frontier’ settings, where it is as an
avenue for redressing anticompetitive acts or practices that have newly
emerged and have not yet been fully absorbed into the fabric of the
Sherman or Clayton acts.”310 In these cases, the behavioral economics
literature may better explain than neoclassical theory why harm is
occurring.

So rather than try to jam a square peg (the evidence of

anticompetitive effects and purpose) in the round hole (the current
neoclassical economic theory underpinning the Clayton and Sherman Act
case law), Section 5 may provide a more logical home for initially bringing
such frontier cases.
Behavioral economics, of course, does not arm an antitrust enforcer or
court with unfettered discretion.
309

Any governmental action must be

See, e.g., Jon Leibowitz, Tales from the Crypt: Episodes ’08 and ’09: The Return
of
Section
5
(Oct.
17,
2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/jleibowitz.pdf; William E. Kovacic, The
Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Nov. 12, 2009), slides
accompanying talk available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/091112abaforum.pdf
(discussing the retrenchment of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act by the Supreme Court
from 1975 to the present as a possible justification for using Section 5); In re Intel Corp.,
FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) (concurring statement of Commissioner J. Thomas
Rosch), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelstatement.pdf.
310
Susan A. Creighton & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Some Thoughts About the Scope
of
Section
5,
(Oct.
17,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/screighton.pdf; see also Thomas B. Leary,
A Suggestion for the Revival of Section 5, (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/tleary.pdf (“[R]eliance on Section 5 might
be most useful in cases where the Commission does, in fact, have reason to believe that
there has been a violation of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act, but where there is not yet
an established body of precedent to support that view.”).
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sufficiently predictable, objective, and transparent under rule-of-law
principles. When the FTC relies on behavioral economics in the context of
Section 5, several safeguards are already in place. First, the FTC lacks
authority to impose criminal penalties, seek treble monetary damages or
obtain retrospective relief under Section 5. Second, private plaintiffs cannot
bring in federal court follow-on treble damage class actions for Section 5
violations.311

Third, the FTC’s decisions are subject to review by the

federal appellate court of the respondent’s choosing, as well as the Supreme
Court. Indeed, when the Commission last used Section 5 in the early 1980s,
its findings of liability were struck down in a trio of federal appellate
decisions which found, among other things, that the Commission failed to
establish predictable rules and legally cognizable anticompetitive effects.312
By all indications, the Roberts Court will impose these same
requirements.313
But as an added safeguard for novel cases, the FTC should use
behavioral economics to explain strong evidence of both anticompetitive
purpose and effects. If corporate executives engage in conduct with the
purpose and actual effect of harming competition, then it makes little sense

311

As Commissioner Kovacic has noted, there is still the risk that plaintiffs will sue
under state baby FTC Acts. See Dissenting Statement of William E. Kovacic, In re
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051-0094,
available
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http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122kovacic.pdf.
It remains to be seen,
however, to what extent this threat will come to fruition.
312
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to immunize such anticompetitive conduct because it is unexplainable under
the Chicago School’s neoclassical economic theories.
CONCLUSION
Competition policy is entering a new age. Interest in antitrust law has
increased world-wide, and the United States no longer holds a monopoly on
competition policy. The question for competition authorities is whether and
to what extent does bounded rationality, self-interest and willpower matter.
Courts and agencies will continue to rely on the assumption of rational,
self-interested profit-maximizers with perfect willpower, which has become
so embedded in antitrust policy, to predict or explain anti-competitive harm.
But reliance on these rational-choice theories will recede in the coming
years as they fail to explain actual market behavior. Here the behavioral
economics literature and other inter-disciplinary economic theories will
advance competition policy in understanding such behavior.
Business marketing executives have long understood behavioral
economics. Next came the behavioral economists and legal scholars, and
now antitrust lawyers and policymakers are starting to study behavioral
economics. The Supreme Court’s economic thinking, as reflected in Trinko
and Leegin, still lags. But behavioral antitrust is no longer on the horizon.
Behavioral economics is not a celebration of our shortcomings. Putting
aside self-interest, which is not accepted as a desirable norm, we will
continually strive toward improving our cognitive abilities and willpower.
Perhaps one day society may evolve in terms of rationality and willpower to
more closely mirror the Chicago School model. In the Paradiso, Dante
described the light in the form of a river pouring its splendour on the banks.
But as Beatrice explained, “The river and the topazes that pass into it and
out and the laughter of the flowers are shadowy forecasts of their truth; not
that these things are imperfect in themselves, but the defect is in thyself,
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that thy vision is not yet so exalted.”314 In understanding better how we err,
we perhaps can find ways to improve ourselves and the way we interact
with others and, in doing do, instill rules of law that more accurately reflect
this enhanced understanding.
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John D. Sinclair Oxford Univ. Press 1961).

